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THE MYSTERIOUS SURVIVAL OF THE POLICY




The last year has seen something old and something new con-
cerning hospitals, informed consent, and the law. At least four appel-
late courts in 2005 have reiterated the old rule that hospitals generally
do not have a duty to obtain the informed consent of their patients
prior to treatment.' In each case, the court's opinion offers little anal-
© 2006 Robert Gatter. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Penn State University, Dickinson School
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1 See Foster v. Traul, 120 P.3d 278, 281-82 (Idaho 2005) (affirming dismissal of
claims that a hospital's nurse negligently failed to assure that the informed consent
had been obtained prior to treatment and that hospital had an independent duty to
obtain informed consent, where the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of the
nursing standard of care with respect to informed consent, and where the statute
provides that doctors have a duty to obtain informed consent and that hospitals may
perform ministerial informed consent tasks without practicing medicine); Mohsan v.
Roule-Graham, 907 So. 2d 804, 806 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing claim that the
hospital, through its nurses, failed to document the patient's consent to a hysterec-
tomy affirmed by state intermediate appellate court where precedent existed holding
that hospitals do not have a duty to obtain informed consent); Daniels v. Durham
County Hosp. Corp., 615 S.E.2d 60, 64-65 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (dismissing claim
against a hospital for nurse's failure to obtain informed consent affirmed by state
intermediate appellate court where precedent existed holding that hospitals do not
have a duty to obtain informed consent, where the state supreme court opinion on
point had no precedential value because that court had been evenly split on whether
hospitals have a duty to obtain informed consent, and where the plaintiff failed to
produce evidence that hospital policy required nurses to obtain informed consent).
Less clear is the ruling in Bailey v. Owens, 793 N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2005), where
an intermediate state appellate court affirmed summary judgment for a hospital on
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ysis of the public policy underlying its ruling, and instead each does
little more than cite to precedent or a statute in support of its conclu-
sion. 2 Prior case law, however, reveals underlying assumptions that
only doctors have the expertise necessary to lead patients through the
informed consent process and that hospitals merely assist physicians
in carrying out the ministerial tasks related to that process.3
At the same time-and in stark contrast to the law's assump-
tions-hospitals made news by implementing systems that direct the
process by which their physicians seek the informed consent of pa-
tients to hospital-based treatments. In particular, hospitals have in-
stalled multimedia platforms designed to walk patients and doctors
through the process of explaining patients' treatment options, disclos-
ing the risks and benefits of those options, recording patients' consent
or refusal of treatments, and incorporating the record of informed
consent into patients' medical charts. For example, in April 2005, it
an informed consent claim. The rule was based on both the hospital's producing a
form signed by the patient authorizing the allegedly unauthorized treatment and the
patient's failure to produce evidence that the hospital knew or should have known
that informed consent was lacking. Because the opinion focuses on the breach ele-
ment of the claim, and because it skips the element of duty in its analysis, it could be
interpreted to suggest that the hospital had an informed consent duty. This interpre-
tation is undercut, however, by the court's citation of Cirella v. Cent. Gen. Hosp., 630
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Porandon v. Karp, 490 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App.
Div. 1985), where the Supreme Court Appellate Division held that, under the state's
informed consent statute, hospitals do not have a duty to obtain informed consent.
Thus, Bailey is best interpreted as a case holding that hospitals do not have a duty to
obtain their patients' informed consent and, even if such a duty existed, the plaintiff
failed to produce evidence tending to establish any breach.
Also noteworthy is Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2005),
which, in the course of recognizing that hospitals can under narrow circumstances be
vicariously liable for the failure of their affiliated physicians to obtain a patient's in-
formed consent, reiterated the principle that hospitals do not owe a direct duty to
patients to obtain their informed consent. Id. at 361-62. Here, a federal district
court, applying New York's informed consent law, denied a motion to dismiss an in-
formed consent claim against a hospital. The complaint alleged that several doctors
at the hospital, who were acting as the hospital's agents, made false marketing claims
about a cancer treatment offered at the hospital in the hopes of attracting cancer
patients from outside of the United States. Id. at 352-53. In denying the motion, the
court ruled that New York's informed consent statute applies only to physicians. Id. at
362. Nonetheless, the court noted that hospitals can be held vicariously liable for
treatment provided by their physicians without informed consent if an agency rela-
tionship can be established. Id. It then reasoned that dismissal of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint for failure to state a cognizable claim is inappropriate because the complaint
alleges that an agency relationship existed between the doctors and the defendant
hospital. Id.
2 See supra note 1.
3 See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
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was reported that the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs was com-
pleting its installation of an automated informed consent application
known as iMedConsent in each of its 162 medical centers nationwide
so as to improve the quality of treatment disclosures and prevent the
loss of paper consent forms.4 The VA is not alone. According to a
July 2005 KPMG health care industry analysis, hospitals across the
country are piloting similar multimedia informed consent aids, in-
cluding HCA, which operates 190 U.S. hospitals. 5
Thus, while hospitals have embarked on a plan to exert unprece-
dented control of the informed consent process, courts remain true to
established law, which presumes that control over-and, conse-
quently, responsibility for-informed consent should reside exclu-
sively with physicians. 6 Given the conflict, one would assume that a
change in the law is simply a matter of time. 7
This Article argues, however, that a change in the law's policy
against imposing informed consent duties on hospitals based on the
new role that hospitals are poised to play in the informed consent
process is unlikely. Instead, it claims that, if the history of this nearly
forty-year-old policy is any indication, it will survive these changes in
the clinical practice of informed consent just as it has routinely sur-
4 See Beckie Kelly Schuerenberg, Consent App Gets OK from VA Center, HEALTH
DATA MGMT., Mar. 2005, http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/current/
PastlssueStory.cfm?ArticleID= 10742&issuedate=2005-04-01.
5 See Richard Merli, Managing the Malpractice Storm Online, KPMG HEALTH CARE
INSIDER, July 14, 2005, http://www.kpmginsiders.com/display-analysis.asp?cs-id=
136915.
6 Hospitals are not the only institutional health care providers to interject them-
selves into the informed consent process. There is evidence that managed care orga-
nizations are becoming similarly involved. See Healthwise, Online Information
Solutions, http://www.healthwise.org/ponline-cont.aspx#top (last visited Feb. 8,
2005) (reporting that eight of the nation's top ten managed care organizations use
Healthwise databases to provide information to their members); see also Frances H.
Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed Consent: Computers and the Doctor-
Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REv. 1019, 1040 (1998) (comparing the involvement of
managed care organizations in informed consent with the involvement of hospitals).
Nonetheless, this Article is limited to the consideration of hospitals because there is a
significant history of informed consent claims against hospitals while very few such
claims have been brought against managed care organizations.
7 Professor Fran Miller predicted in a 1998 article that, as hospitals continue to
take an ever greater role in educating patients about their conditions and treatment
options, it is only a matter of time before the law recognizes that the standard of care
for hospitals in the informed consent arena has changed. See Miller, supra note 6, at
1040; see also Shelley S. Fraser, Note, Hospital Liability: Drawing a Fine Line with Informed
Consent in Today's Evolving Health Care Arena, I IND. HEALTH L. REv. 253, 277 (2004)
(concluding that the time may have arrived when the law will begin to hold hospitals
accountable for their role in the informed consent process).
2oo6] 120 5
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
vived so many similar changes before. It has persisted despite a steady
expansion of the institutionalization of informed consent. It has also
survived the discovery that physicians generally fail to communicate
treatment information in ways that enable patients to understand that
information. Additionally, the policy has remained intact even as
courts have diminished the role of medical expertise in informed con-
sent law, and even as federal regulations impose a duty on hospitals to
oversee informed consent related to any human subjects research they
house. Furthermore, the policy has outlasted a historic expansion of
hospital liability for treatment injuries based on both vicarious and
direct corporate liability doctrines.
The staying power of the law's policy is remarkable in part be-
cause it has bucked so many of these trends, and in part because the
policy has done so without changing its underlying rationale. Mysteri-
ously, courts continue to claim that informed consent is a process
driven primarily by medical expertise and, consequently, that hospi-
tals are incapable of overseeing it despite the fact that these claims are
contradicted by current policy and practices concerning both in-
formed consent and health care quality assurance. Indeed, this Arti-
cle challenges each of the law's claims and finds them to be outdated
and unpersuasive. Given that the law's policy against imposing in-
formed consent duties on hospitals has survived nonetheless, this Arti-
cle concludes that some other rationale must be at work and that this
rationale has yet to be articulated.
As a result of this analysis, this Article not only proposes a redistri-
bution of informed consent responsibilities among physicians and
hospitals, it also predicts that the law will not adopt such a redistribu-
tion unless the reasons for the law's existing policy are more clearly
articulated and accounted for. This Article then takes on this task,
hypothesizing that the law's policy reflects a misguided effort by
courts to preserve the trustworthiness of medicine and the medical
profession. The trust hypothesis is tested against clues offered by
courts about why the policy against imposing informed consent duties
on hospitals is worth preserving. Additionally, it is bolstered by other
sources confirming the perception that the doctor-patient relation-
ship is fiduciary in nature and, more importantly, that the informed
consent process is fundamental to sustaining that trust relationship.
Finally, this Article provides a complete picture of medical trust based
upon recent analysis of the phenomenon and demonstrates that the
law best preserves medical trust by recognizing that hospitals and phy-
sicians are cofiduciaries that enter into a treatment relationship with a
hospital patient. This, in turn, supports the view that a policy of mak-
ing the informed consent process the exclusive turf of physicians is
12o6 [VOL. 8 1:4
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erroneous and that redistributing responsibilities between these
cofiduciaries is a better strategy.
This Article begins in Part I with an analysis of the case law ad-
dressing informed consent claims against hospitals and the policy
against imposing informed consent duties on hospitals established
therein. Part II then tracks the policy's survival despite several con-
flicting clinical and legal trends, and it concludes with a set of pro-
posed institutional informed consent duties. These institutional
duties include (1) a duty to require that physicians on staff obtain the
informed consent of their patients prior to any treatments provided at
the hospital, (2) a duty to assure that no treatment is provided in the
hospital without prior verification that the patient has provided an
informed consent to the proposed treatment, (3) a duty for hospitals
to include in their quality assurance programs the monitoring of in-
formed consent practices, (4) a duty to assure that any treatment in-
formation disseminated by hospitals directly to patients is accurate,
complete, understandable, and equally accessible to all similarly situ-
ated patients, and (5) a duty to assure that any individuals assigned by
a hospital to assist informed patients in the decisionmaking process
are qualified to provide such assistance and that they are reasonably
available to patients when needed. Finally, Part III presents the trust
hypothesis to both account for the policy's persistence and argue for
its reform.
I. THE LAw's Poi.cY AGAINST IMPOSING INFORMED CONSENT DUTIES
ON HOSPITALS
While physicians have a legally enforceable duty to obtain the in-
formed consent of their patients prior to treatment, hospitals gener-
ally do not. As demonstrated below, courts almost universally refuse
to impose duties on hospitals to disclose treatment information to
their patients or to verify that hospital patients received treatment in-
formation from their treating physicians. In some jurisdictions, courts
even refuse to recognize a hospital's duty to assure that patients have
consented to treatment, regardless of whether consent is sufficiently
informed. In virtually every case, courts refuse to impose such duties
out of deference to physicians' expertise and for the purpose of pre-
serving the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship. Although the
law recognizes circumstances in which a hospital can be liable in an
informed consent claim-such as where the hospital employs the
breaching physician or where the breach concerned participation in
medical research housed by the hospital-these circumstances are so
narrowly tailored that they are unlikely to affect how hospitals provide
2oo6] ti207
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treatment information to patients in the vast majority of daily patient
encounters. Moreover, the recent trend among courts appears to
favor strict adherence to the traditional policy of protecting against
hospital intrusion into the informed consent process. All of this is
described in detail below following a brief overview of the informed
consent doctrine.
A. Informed Consent Law: A Short Primer
Informed consent is a legal doctrine that enables individuals in-
jured as a result of unauthorized medical treatments to receive com-
pensation from the treating physician.8 It does so by imposing two
related duties on physicians.9 First, it obligates physicians to disclose
8 See generally JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 41-164 (2d ed. 2001); RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A
HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 25-39, 114-50 (1986); JAY KATZ, THE
SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (2002). For a brief overview of in-
formed consent law, see Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of
Physician Inquiry, 31 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 561-67 (2000).
9 The distinction between the two duties can be difficult to detect in case law,
but it is most often revealed in the subtleties of the language courts use to describe
the informed consent doctrine. See, e.g., Collins v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No.
Civ.A. 3:01CV979LN, 2001 WL 34073167, at *7 (S.D. Miss. June 21, 2001) (referring
to the duty to warn patients about treatment risks and the duty to obtain consent to
treatment as "twin duties"); Van Sice v. Sentany, 595 N.E.2d 264, 267 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (referring to the informed consent doctrine as containing "duties to disclose
information and obtain informed consent"); Hannemann v. Boyson, 698 N.W.2d 714,
728 (Wis. 2005) (referring to the state's informed consent doctrine as imposing duties
to "disclose [information] and obtain [consent]"). The distinction courts draw be-
tween claims for unauthorized treatment and claims for insufficiently informed con-
sents to treatment more clearly reveal that the doctrine imposes duties to both inform
patients of treatment information and perform only treatments that are authorized by
patients. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Kellum, 975 S.W.2d 522, 524 (Tenn. 1998) (distin-
guishing between "cases in which a doctor performs an unauthorized procedure" and
cases in which "the patient claims that the doctor failed to inform the patient of any
or all the risks inherent in the procedure"); Bundrick v. Stewart, 114 P.3d 1204, 1208
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing between a claim for a physician's failure to
obtain consent at all and a claim for a physician's failure to disclose treatment infor-
mation). Similarly, pattern jury instructions indicate a distinction between a physi-
cian's obligation to obtain consent and her obligation to provide information to her
patients on which they can make an intelligent choice about whether or not to con-
sent to proposed treatments. Compare, e.g., CIVIL COMM. ON CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL (BAJI) § 6.10 (2005) [hereinafter BAJI] (pro-
viding that "a physician has a duty to obtain the consent of a patient before treating or
operating on the patient"), with id. § 6.11 (providing that "a physician has a duty to
disclose to the patient all material information to enable the patient to make an in-
formed decision regarding the proposed operation or treatment"); MINN. DIST.
JUDGES ASS'N COMM. ONJURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES-CIVIL (CWJIG) § 80.22 (identify-
[VOL. 8 1:412o8
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information to their patients that is material to the treatment deci-
sions their patients will make.10 Second, the doctrine requires a physi-
cian to abstain from treating a patient until the patient has consented
to the treatment."' Thus, a physician can be held liable under the
doctrine if she fails to obtain her patient's consent, 12 or if she obtains
her patient's consent but does so without first providing the patient
with adequate treatment information. 13
If a patient is treated without her consent, treatment is unautho-
rized, and the informed consent claim generally takes the form of a
battery cause of action.' 4 Such "no-consent" cases are rare. Far more
ing the duty of a physician to obtain a patient's consent prior to treatment), with id.
§ 80.25 (identifying the duty of physicians to disclose treatment information to pa-
tients); 1B COMm. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS'N OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,
NEW YORK PATT'ERN JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL § 2:150A (3d ed. 2006), with 2 COMM.
ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS ASS'N OF SUPREME COURTJUSTICES, NEW YORK PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTION-CIVIL § 3.3 (2d ed. 2006). Finally, secondary sources acknowledge
that informed consent doctrine imposes two related duties. See, e.g., Paula Walter, The
Doctrine of Inforned Consent: A Tale of Two Cultures and Two Legal Traditions, 14 IssuEs L.
& MED. 357, 366-67 (1999) (identifying the two duties).
10 See BAJI, supra note 9, § 6.11 (providing that "[a] physician has a duty to dis-
close to the patient all material information to enable the patient to make an in-
formed decision regarding the proposed operation or treatment" and indicating that
this instruction should be combined with instruction 6.10).
11 See BAJI, supra note 9, § 6.10 (stating that "[a] physician has a duty to obtain
the consent of a patient before treating or operating on the patient").
12 See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435 (Ariz. 2003)
(recognizing patient's informed consent claim against health care provider for alleg-
edly administering a pain medication other than one of the two medications author-
ized by the patient).
13 See, e.g., Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975)
(concerning patient, who was paralyzed as a result of test in which contrast dye was
injected into his arteries through a catheter, claiming a lack of informed consent
because the physician failed to disclose the risk of paralysis associated with the proce-
dure at the time the patient consented).
14 See Mole v. Jutton, 846 A.2d 1035, 1045-48 (Md. 2004) (rejecting argument of
plaintiff that she was entitled to bring her informed consent claim on a battery theory
and holding that the battery version of an informed consent claim applies only where
treatment was provided without any consent or when the treatment exceeded the
bounds of the patient's consent).
In "no-consent" cases, the compensable harm includes not only any negative con-
sequences of treatment, but also the treatment itself, and this is true even if the treat-
ment is a technical success. See, e.g., Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529, 536 n.4
(S.C. 2002) (rejecting physician's argument that proof of the patient's receiving
blood products that the patient had expressly refused was insufficient to establish a
legally cognizable injury in a battery-based informed consent claim). Causation tends
to be uncontroversial, so long as the claimed harm to the patient is the sort that
would result from the kind of treatment received. See Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal,
798 A.2d 742, 750-51 (Pa. 2002) (identifying, in the course of addressing the need for
2006] 120 9
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common is the informed consent claim alleging that a physician has
breached the duty to disclose adequate treatment information to pa-
tients prior to obtaining the consent of the patient to treatment. In
those cases, the plaintiff has consented to treatment, but she claims
that her physician failed to provide her with sufficient information on
which to base her treatment decision and that she was harmed as a
result.15
Unlike claims alleging completely unauthorized treatment,
claims based on a breach of the physician's duty to disclose generally
sound in negligence. 16 They require physicians to disclose "material"
treatment information to patients. 17 Although the law in every state
imposes such a duty, states are divided about how best to define its
scope, with roughly half requiring physicians to disclose information
that a reasonable person would consider significant to the treatment
decision at hand,' and the other jurisdictions directing doctors to
disclose information that a reasonably prudent physician would dis-
expert testimony as to causation in a battery-based claim for total lack of consent, that
plaintiff need only establish that the claimed injuries arose from the unauthorized
medical treatment).
15 Most often, plaintiffs claim that their physicians failed to disclose a risk of harm
associated with the authorized procedure. See, e.g., Scaria, 227 N.W.2d at 650 (discuss-
ing failure to disclose risk of paralysis from catheterization). Claims can also be based
on a failure of the physician to disclose other kinds of treatment information, such as
the patient's prognosis, see, e.g., Martin v. Richards, 531 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Wis. 1995)
(alleging failure to disclose that head injuries could result in an intracranial bleed),
or alternative treatment to the one proposed by the physician, see, e.g., id. (alleging
failure to disclose option of an immediate CT scan to diagnose severity of head
injuries).
16 See BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 134-36. Pennsylvania law is a notable excep-
tion. In that jurisdiction, all claims for the failure to obtain informed consent sound
in battery whether based on a breach of the duty to obtain consent or a breach of the
duty to disclose treatment information. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when re-
viewing the decision of an intermediate court of appeals, stated,
The Superior Court also erred in further distinguishing informed consent
from medical battery premised upon the alleged applicability of negligence
principles in informed consent cases .... No such distinction exists in our
jurisprudence. Lack of consent for surgery involves the same general concept with-
out regard to whether consent was uninformed or completely lacking. The result is the
same-the patient is subjected to a surgical procedure to which he did not consent.
Montgomery, 798 A.2d at 749 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The battery basis
of informed consent claims in Pennsylvania has been retained in the codified version
of the claim. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.504 (West Supp. 2005); Kremp v.
Yavorek, No. 99 CV 3759, 2002 WL 31730629 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. May 24, 2002) (inter-
preting the almost identical predecessor to the current statute).
17 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18 See Gatter, supra note 8, at 563 & n.40.
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close in the same or similar circumstances.' 9 The split among the ju-
risdictions is largely explained by a difference of opinion about
whether or not the identification of treatment information to disclose
is a matter of medical expertise. 20
A plaintiff who establishes a breach of the duty to disclose mate-
rial treatment information must also prove that the inadequate disclo-
sure caused her to consent to treatment.21 This requires the plaintiff
to prove that a reasonable person with the information that was
wrongfully withheld from the patient would have refused the treat-
ment that allegedly harmed the plaintiff.22 Additionally, the plaintiff
must establish that the treatment to which she consented was a sub-
stantial factor in causing the claimed injuries. 25 Where the claim con-
cerns a failure to disclose an alternative treatment, the plaintiff must
establish that she would have avoided the claimed injury had she re-
ceived the alternative treatment.24 Where the claim concerns a failure
to disclose a treatment risk, the plaintiff must establish that the undis-
closed risk actually materialized in her case. 2 5
In summary, informed consent law compensates individuals for
injuries resulting from unauthorized medical treatments under a bat-
tery theory. Additionally, it permits a patient to recover damages for
injuries resulting from a bad treatment outcome that would likely
have been avoided had the patient been informed of all reasonable
treatment options or injuries resulting from an undisclosed risk of
treatment that the patient would not have voluntarily assumed had it
been made known.
19 See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985).
20 See BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 46-51; see also Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d
1123, 1131 (Me. 1980) (rejecting the reasonable person standard and adopting the
prudent physician standard for disclosure and reasoning that the law avoids "placing
good medical practice in jeopardy" and that it must work to keep "[t]he physician's
attention . . .focused on the best interests of his patient and not on what a lay jury,
unschooled in medicine, may, after the fact, conclude he should have disclosed");
KATZ, supra note 8, at 81 (quoting a Wisconsin Supreme Courtjustice who wrote that
while "'[c]hildren play at the game of being a doctor .... judges and juries ought not
to'"). Katz sees claims of medical expertise used to justify legal rules, such as the use
of the prudent physician disclosure standard over the reasonable person standard, as
part of a larger political struggle of the medical profession to maintain its authority
and to prevent lay interference in matters of medicine. See id. at 30-47.
21 See BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 138-40.
22 See, e.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 676 (Haw. 1995).
23 See BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 137-38.
24 SeeJoan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment, 85 IoWA L. REV. 261, 329 n.225 (1999).
25 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972); McMahon v.
Finlayson, 632 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
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The history of informed consent law is one largely of disap-
pointed expectations. In part, this is because the legal doctrine is
founded upon, 26 and repeatedly judged against,27 a set of ethical aspi-
rations that are difficult for the law to satisfy in practice. For example,
26 Historically speaking, the legal doctrine preceded and inspired the ethical doc-
trine. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 91-98. In fact, the leading history on
informed consent claims that "[i]nformed consent is a creature originally of law and
later snatched from the courts by interdisciplinary interests and spearheaded by...
[philosophical] ethics." Id. at 92.
This is not to say that informed consent law is not affected by ethics. Judges
ruling on informed consent cases prior to development of the ethical doctrine in the
late 1970s refer to broad notions of self-determination and autonomy in an apparent
effort to establish an ethical foundation for the legal rules they apply. See, e.g., Canter-
bury, 464 F.2d at 780 (identifying the right to bodily integrity as "[t]he root pre-
mise . . .fundamental in American jurisprudence"); Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161
(1905) (proclaiming the right to bodily integrity as "the first and greatest right" of
free citizens, which is universally accepted among free governments); Natanson v.
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("Anglo-American law starts with the premise
of thorough-going self-determination."); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.
92 (N.Y. 1914) (announcing that each person has "the right to determine what shall
be done with his own body"), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
Moreover, the law has attempted to account for advances in the ethical doctrine be-
ginning in the 1980s. For example, case law exists that expressly refers to the ethical
doctrine. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 739 F.2d 1502, 1506-07 (10th Cir. 1984)
(quoting a passage from JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 92
(1984), to justify the application of a disclosure rule to the facts of the case); Arato v.
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605-06 (Cal. 1993) (referring to the debate concerning the
gap between the aspirations of the doctrine and its practical implementation); In re
Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 418 (N.J. 1987) (O'Hern,J., concurring) (referring to the con-
cept of "shared decisionmaking" as proposed by the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research to
help resolve a case involving a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment). Addition-
ally, legal academics routinely use the ethical aspirations of informed consent as a
basis from which to critique the legal doctrine and propose changes to it. See BERG ET
AL., supra note 8, at 146-61 (reviewing scholarly criticism of informed consent law).
27 See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 274-87 (distinguishing between
informed consent as an ethical doctrine that requires autonomous authorization of
medical treatment and informed consent as a set of institutional rules-including
legal rules-designed to determine if consent to treatment is valid, and recognizing
that, while legal rules fail to satisfy the ethical doctrine, they should nonetheless be
modeled after the ethical doctrine); KATZ, supra note 8, at 48-84 (contrasting the
holdings in informed consent cases, which construed the rights of patients narrowly
and the discretion of physicians broadly, with the proclamations of courts in those
cases that informed consent law protects patient self-determination); Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903-04 (1994) (identifying the com-
mon practice among informed consent "idealists" to criticize the legal doctrine of
informed consent based on its failure to achieve the goals of the ethical doctrine).
Katz concludes that "[j]udges toyed briefly with the idea of patients' right to self-
determination and largely cast it aside." KATZ, supra note 8, at 82.
[VOL. 81:41212
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underlying the informed consent are ethical principles demanding
that medicine respect patient autonomy and pursue shared decision-
making between a doctor and patient.28  Shared decisionmaking
imagines that a doctor and a patient work in tandem to help the pa-
tient arrive at an autonomous decision, with the doctor acting as the
medical expert and the patient acting as expert as to her values and
preferences. Despite requiring that physicians provide treatment in-
formation to patients, informed consent law falls short of realizing
shared decisionmaking because it does not require physicians to as-
sure that patients understand the information that is provided to
them 29 or to help patients identify and apply their own values to the
treatment information provided. Consequently, it is possible for a
physician to merely warn patients about treatment risks in order to
comply with the law and yet fall far short of the shared decisionmak-
ing ideal.
B. The Policy Against Imposing a Duty for Hospitals To Disclose
Treatment Information
The distinction between cases involving duty to disclose treat-
ment information and cases involving the duty to obtain consent prior
to treatment, discussed above, remains important in informed consent
cases brought against hospitals. Other ancillary duties arise in each of
these kinds of cases as well. For example, cases alleging a breach of
the duty to obtain patient authorization may also allege that a hospital
has a duty to document patient consent and a duty to identify and
resolve any discrepancies between treatments being provided and
treatments authorized in the consent documents. Cases involving in-
adequately informed consent, on the other hand, may also address
the duty of the hospital to require the physician to provide treatment
information and a duty to assure that the physician has done so.
While courts have often disregarded the difference between cases
alleging inadequately informed consent and cases alleging a complete
absence of consent, these distinctions provide a useful structure for
categorizing cases and analyzing them as a whole. 30 Thus, the analysis
28 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 3-20, 91-101; KATZ, supra note 8, at
48-84.
29 See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15 (explaining that the law treats physi-
cian's disclosure as a proxy for patient's understanding).
30 There are cases in which this distinction is difficult to discern. For example,
Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App.), affd, 362
S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987), involved an alleged duty to assure that a patient's attending
physician obtained the patient's informed consent to treatment. Under the facts of
the case, the patient complained that she had not received information about her
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below will begin with cases addressing the claimed duty of hospitals to
disclose treatment information and the related duty to assure that a
patient's physician has provided such information. It will then move
to a discussion of the duty of hospitals to prevent treatment in the
absence of consent and the related duty of documenting consent and
resolving discrepancies between the consent documentation and ac-
tual treatment.
Ironically, the history of the law's policy against imposing on hos-
pitals a duty to disclose treatment information or a duty to assure that
the patient's physician has made such disclosures begins with a case
upholding such a duty. In 1966 an intermediate New York appellate
court in Fiorentino v. Wenger3 1 upheld a verdict against a hospital based
on the hospital's failure to assure that treatment information had
been disclosed to the plaintiff.32 In that case, a fourteen-year-old boy
suffering from a curvature of the spine died from complications of
experimental spinal surgery.3 3 The surgery involved attaching a jack
to the spine with screws, and it had been developed by the surgeon in
this case as an alternative to spinal fusion, which was the standard
treatment at the time. He was the only surgeon in the country em-
ploying the procedure, and he had performed it thirty-five times previ-
ously with mixed results. In five cases, complications developed,
including one case resulting in paralysis and death. The surgeon be-
gan referring patients to the defendant-hospital when another hospi-
tal prohibited him from performing the spinal-jack procedure in its
facilities. The defendant-hospital knew about the nature of the sur-
gery, its novelty, the prior complications patients had experienced
treatment alternatives or about their respective risks and benefits (which suggests a
breach of the duty to disclose); yet, she had not been asked to consent at all to the
treatment (which suggests a breach of the duty not to treat patients without their
permission). In such a case, courts must be clear whether a duty to assure that in-
formed consent was obtained means a duty to assure that the patient has authorized
treatment whether or not she has received sufficient treatment information, or a duty
to assure that the patient received sufficient treatment information prior to her con-
sent, or both. In Campbell the duty to assure that a patient's informed consent has
been obtained appears to include a duty to assure that sufficient disclosures have
been made by the attending physician to the patient. See id. at 907-08. For a more
detailed description of Campbell, see infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
31 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div. 1966) (mem.), rev'd, 227 N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 1967).
32 Although Fiorentino was the first appellate court decision to address the duty of
hospitals with respect to the disclosures made in the process of informed consent, it is
not the first to address hospital liability for nonconsensual medical treatment.
33 The factual summary is an amalgamation of those described in each of the
appellate court decisions in the case. See cases cited supra note 31.
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from the procedure, and that the surgeon no longer performed the
procedure at another area hospital.
The boy's mother sued both the surgeon and the hospital in
which the surgery was performed, claiming that neither had suffi-
ciently informed her about the surgery so that she could make an in-
formed decision about whether to consent to it for her son. She
claimed that she was not told the risks of and alternatives to the sur-
gery, including that the procedure was experimental and that it car-
ried a risk of death. Ajury returned a verdict in her favor against both
the surgeon and the hospital.
On appeal, the court affirmed the verdict without any analysis or
citation to authority. The only clue to its reasoning is one concluding
sentence. After holding that the physician had a duty to disclose to
the plaintiff "that the procedure he proposed was novel and unortho-
dox and that there were risks incident to or possible in its use," the
court wrote:
We are ... of the opinion that, knowing the nature of the pro-
posed operation, the history of its utilization by the defendant physi-
cian, and the fact that it had not been recognized by the medical
profession in the community, or in the nation, as an accepted
method for the correction of scoliosis, the defendant Hospital was
obligated to ascertain that the physician had made such a disclosure
before permitting the operation to take place.3
4
Thus, the court imposed on the hospital not a duty to disclose treat-
ment information to the patient, but rather a duty of oversight to as-
sure that the surgeon had fulfilled his disclosure obligations.
A dissenter on the panel argued that, when an independently
contracted physician has obtained consent, a hospital should not have
a duty "to go behind such consent to ascertain whether .. .an in-
formed consent had been given .... Indeed, discussion by the Hospi-
tal of the matter of consent might have constituted an invasion of the
confidential relationship existing between the patient and his doc-
tor."3 5 This was a precursor of reasoning that would be applied in this
case and in many others.
The highest appellate court in New York reversed Fiorentino in
1967, holding that, as a matter of law, hospitals do not have an obliga-
tion to confirm that its physicians have obtained the informed consent
of their patients to hospital-based treatments. 36 The court's holding
was based on the need to keep doctor-patient relationships free from
34 Fiorentino, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
35 Id. (Rabin, J., dissenting).
36 227 N.E.2d 296.
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interference by those unqualified to make professional medical
judgments.
[I] t would not be just for a court, having the benefit of hindsight, to
impose liability on a hospital for its failure to intervene in the inde-
pendent physician-patient relationship. That relationship is always
one of great delicacy. And it is perhaps the most delicate matter,
often with fluctuating indications, from time to time with the same
patient, whether a physician should advise the patient (or his fam-
ily), more or less, about a proposed procedure, the gruesome de-
tails, and the available alternatives. Such a decision is particularly
one calling for the exercise of medical judgment. In the exercise of
that discretion, involving as it does grave risks to the patient, a third
party should not ordinarily meddle. 3 7
Since 1967, courts in nearly forty cases spread over twenty-two dif-
ferent jurisdictions have held that hospitals do not have a duty to dis-
close treatment information to their patients or to assure that
patients' physicians do so, ruling instead that the duty of disclosure
applies only to physicians.3 8 These decisions have come at a steady
37 Id. at 300 (citation omitted).
38 See Keyser v. St. Mary's Hosp., 662 F. Supp. 191 (D. Idaho 1987); Wells v. Sto-
rey, 792 So. 2d 1034 (Ala. 1999); Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am., 963
P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1998); Krane v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75 (Colo. Ct. App.
1987); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Doe v. Stamford Hosp., No.
FA 970160804S, 1998 WL 182411 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 8, 1998); Parr v. Palmyra
Park Hosp., 228 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Foster v. Traul, No. 30052, 2005 WL
1692955 (Idaho Sept. 12, 2005); Winters v. Podzamsky, 621 N.E.2d 72 (Il1. App. Ct.
1993); Pickle v. Curns, 435 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Pauscher v. Iowa Method-
ist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987); Lincoln v. Gupta, 370 N.W.2d 312 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985); Baltzell v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 718 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Ackerman v. Lerwick, 676 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Roberson v. Menorah
Med. Ctr., 588 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156 (Neb.
1997); Cooper v. Curry, 589 P.2d 201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); DeSena ex rel. DeSena v.
NYU Med. Ctr., 773 N.Y.S.2d 836 (App. Div. 2003); Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.E.2d 392
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Long v. Jaszczak, 688 N.W.2d 173 (N.D. 2004); Kershaw v.
Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1989); Grandillo v. Montesclaros, 739 N.E.2d 863
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Goss v. Okla. Blood Inst., 856 P.2d 998 (Okla. Civ. App. 1990);
Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Krout v. Martin, 50 Pa.
D. & C.3d 472 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1989); George v. Ayoub, 50 Pa. D. & C.3d 322 (Pa. Ct.
Com. P1. 1988); Gross v. Hoyt, 1 Pa. D. & C.4th 490 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1988); Margotta
v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 47 Pa. D. & C.3d 300 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1987); Hurley v. Won,
9 Pa. D. & C.3d 796 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1979); Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn.,
Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804 (Tenn. 2000); Boney v. Mother Frances Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 140
(Tex. App. 1994); Ritter v. Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1990); Nevauex v. Park
Place Hosp., 656 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. App. 1983); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire
Blood Bank, 785 P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990); Alexander v. Gonser, 711 P.2d 347 (Wash.
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pace of one or two each year, 39 and they have been highly consistent
in their reasoning. Most often, courts describe informed consent as a
delicate process in which the physician's intimate familiarity with each
patient joins the doctor's expert knowledge about treatments and his
or her professional sense of how to inform without alarming each pa-
tient.40 Thus, they see it as a uniquely professional process that
culminates in a conversation between doctor and patient that is tai-
lored to the particular needs of each patient in terms of both the sub-
stantive disclosures and the method of communication. 41 Hospitals,
they say, are ill-suited to participate in such a professional process be-
cause they lack the expertise, the knowledge of the patient, and the
professional judgment to manage the task of communicating sensitive
information to vulnerable patients. Consider for example, this pas-
sage written by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in a 1995 opinion:
It is the surgeon and not the hospital who has the education, train-
ing and experience necessary to advise each patient of risks associ-
ated with the proposed surgery. Likewise, by virtue of his
relationship with the patient, the physician is in the best position to
know the patient's medical history and to evaluate and explain the
risks of a particular operation in light of the particular medical his-
tory. Appellants' attempt to impose upon a hospital the duty not
only to "ensure" that physicians obtain informed consent but also to
draft the "substantive information to be disclosed," ignores these
unique aspects of the physician-patient relationship. 42
According to this view, requiring hospitals to participate or over-
see the disclosure process would do more harm than good by dis-
rupting the doctor-patient relationship at one of its most fragile
Ct. App. 1985); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1975);
Staudt v. Froedtert Mem'I Lutheran Hosp., 580 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
39 No cases were reported after 1967 until 1975, but from 1975 through 1979,
there were five reported cases. During the period from 1980 through 1989, fifteen
cases were reported. From 1990 through 1999, thirteen cases were reported. And
another five cases have been reported from 2000 through 2005.
40 See, e.g., Wells, 792 So. 2d at 1038-39; Ward, 963 P.2d at 1039-40; Krane, 738
P.2d at 77; Roberson, 588 S.W.2d at 137; Giese, 567 N.W.2d at 163; Howell, 785 P.2d at
822; Alexander, 711 P.2d at 351.
41 See Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 459 (W. Va. 1982) ("The process of con-
senting to medical treatment, especially surgery, is an ongoing process in many cases.
Discussion between the physician and his or her patient concerning proposed treat-
ment may very well continue between the time the patient first walks into the physi-
cian's office and the time of surgery or other treatment.").
42 Kelly, 664 A.2d at 151.
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moments. 4 3 While most courts are motivated to protect patients from
intrusions into their confidential communications with their physi-
cians by institutions unqualified to practice medicine, some also ap-
pear to be protecting the professional turf of physicians by
emphasizing the impropriety of questioning medical authority.44 As
one judge put it, a duty to oversee the informed consent process is a
"disturbing duty of going behind a treating physician's back."4 5
Despite concern for the meddlesome intrusions of unskilled hos-
pitals into the delicate process by which treatment information is dis-
closed to hospital patients, courts have acknowledged two unique
circumstances in which a hospital can be held liable for breach of a
duty to disclose. Yet, both are readily distinguishable from the bulk of
unsuccessful claims of inadequate disclosure against hospitals. Conse-
quently, they have not undermined the general rule against imposing
disclosure duties on hospitals, and they are unlikely to affect hospital
behavior with respect to information disclosure.
First, a hospital can be held vicariously liable when one of its affil-
iated physicians breaches the duty to disclose treatment information
to a patient prior to hospital-based treatment, but only if the hospital
employs the physician or otherwise controls the physician's conduct
within the hospital as if it employed the physician.4 6 This exception is
43 See, e.g., Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 362 (stating that the process of information
disclosure "lie[s] at the heart of the doctor-patient relationship" and therefore hospi-
tals should not intervene); Roberson, 588 S.W.2d at 137 ("[T]he presentation to the
patient of risks involved in prospective surgery cannot but call for some very nice
judgments."); Alexander, 711 P.2d at 351 (imposing a duty on hospitals to intervene in
the process of disclosure would be more disruptive than beneficial); Cross, 294 S.E.2d
at 459 (concluding informed consent is an ongoing process that takes place over mul-
tiple encounters between doctor and patient, which would only be disrupted if hospi-
tals were involved).
44 See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 479 (Conn. 1990) (expressing disbe-
lief that a hospital, by adopting a rule that prohibited treatment in the absence of a
signed consent form, could have intended a nurse to "countermand the judgment" of
the attending physician that consent had been obtained despite the existence of an
unsigned consent form).
45 Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 914 (N.C. Ct. App.)
(Orr, J., dissenting in part), affd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987).
46 See Gotlin v. Ledermen, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349, 362-64 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (over-
turning dismissal of informed consent claim against hospital where the complaint
alleged vicarious liability for breach of the duty of disclosure by physicians alleged to
be the employees or agents of the hospital); Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 772 P.2d
1027, 1031 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding a hospital can be vicariously liable for its
physician's breach of the duty of disclosure, but only where it is established that the
physician was employed by the hospital); see also Valcin v. Pub. Health Trust, 473 So.
2d 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (addressing the informed consent claim against
public hospital on its merits where the doctor was employed by the hospital). But see
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a straight forward application of the respondeat superior doctrine. 47
Despite being widely recognized, however, the exception is rarely ap-
plicable because physicians are generally not employed by the hospi-
tals in which they practice. Instead, most physicians have
independent contractor relationships with the hospitals in which they
practice based on their holding nonexclusive privileges to treat pa-
tients in those hospitals. Courts have ruled that this is an insufficient
basis on which to claim that the hospital controls the physician's con-
duct with respect to informed consent disclosures. 48 Given that hospi-
tals generally do not employ the physicians who practice in their
facilities, this exception is unlikely to affect whether and how hospitals
participate in the informed consent process.
Moreover, one appellate court has ruled that hospitals cannot be
held vicariously liable for even its employed physician's breach of the
duty to disclose treatment information, suggesting that the vicarious
liability exception could be injeopardy. In Valles v. Albert Einstein Med-
ical Center,4 9 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reviewed a claim of vica-
rious liability against a hospital for the failure of an allegedly
employed physician to disclose treatment information to a patient. A
lower court had granted summary judgment to the hospital, and the
plaintiff on appeal argued that hospitals are subject to vicarious liabil-
ity for the failure of their employed physicians to obtain informed
consent, and that a question of fact existed about whether the defen-
dant-hospital actually employed the physician in this case, which ques-
tion precluded summaryjudgment. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
was skeptical that there was sufficient evidence in the record to raise a
question of fact about whether the physician was an employee or an
independent contractor of the hospital. 50 Rather than rule on this
basis, however, the court held that the hospital was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. 5 1 It reasoned that hospitals simply lack the
ability to control the disclosure practices of physicians and, without
such control, cannot be subject to vicarious liability.
In our view, a medical facility cannot maintain control over... [in-
formed consent practices within] the physician-patient relation-
Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa. 2002) (holding that
hospitals cannot be vicariously liable for the failure of even their employed physicians
to obtain informed consent because hospitals cannot control the process by which
physicians obtain informed consent).
47 See, e.g., Gotlin, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
48 See, e.g., Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 2004).
49 805 A.2d 1232.
50 See id. at 1238-39.
51 See id. at 1239.
2006] 121 9
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ship.... Informed consent flows from the discussions each patient
has with his physician, based on the facts and circumstances each
case presents. We decline to interject an element of a hospital's
control into this highly individualized and dynamic relationship....
Thus, we hold that as a matter of law, a medical facility lacks the
control over the manner in which the physician performs his duty
to obtain informed consent so as to render the facility vicariously
liable. 52
To date, there is no indication that courts in other jurisdictions
are persuaded by Valles.53 Courts in each of two cases on point, which
were decided after Valles, recognized that a hospital can be vicariously
liable for the failure of a physician employed by the hospital to obtain
the informed consent of a hospital patient, and each did so without
distinguishing (or even citing) Valles.54 Thus, Pennsylvania's refusal
to recognize the vicarious liability exception may be nothing more
than an outlier as compared to the law in other jurisdictions. On the
other hand, because the ruling in Valles is based on the premise that
hospitals are incapable of controlling the disclosure practices of its
physicians-a proposition almost universally accepted in the case
law-we may not yet know the persuasive impact of Valles in other
jurisdictions. Thus, the vicarious liability exception has a narrow
reach, and, depending on reaction to Valles outside of Pennsylvania, it
may become extinct.
A second exception applies to hospitals housing clinical research
on humans. Courts have held that a hospital, when acting as a re-
search institution, owes a duty directly to the human subjects of such
research to assure that such subject receives specific information con-
cerning the research and its risks prior to consenting to participate in
52 Id. at 1239. Oddly, the court went so far as to say that, when a physician em-
ployed by a hospital fails to provide adequate disclosures as part of obtaining a pa-
tient's informed consent to a hospital-based procedure, the physician is acting outside
the scope of employment. See id.
53 A federal court applying Pennsylvania law relied on Valles to dismiss a vicarious
liability claim against a hospital based on the alleged failure of physicians employed
by the hospital to obtain the plaintiffs informed consent to a blood transfusion. See
Calfee v. City Ave. Hosp., No. Civ.A. 02-1085, 2003 WL 21197311 (E.D. Pa. May 21,
2003).
54 See Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing vicari-
ous liability claims against hospital for failure of a physician to obtain informed con-
sent is inappropriate where complaint alleges an employment or other agency
relationship); Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 2004) (dismissing
vicarious liability claims against hospital for failure of a nonemployed physician to
obtain a patient's informed consent is appropriate because plaintiff cannot make out
a sufficient agency relationship).
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the study.55 Federal law regulates medical research on humans, 56 and
it imposes informed consent duties directly on hospitals that permit
such research to be conducted within their facilities. 57 When per-
forming in its capacity as a research institution, a hospital must estab-
lish an institutional review board (IRB), and no research on human
subjects may be conducted within the hospital unless it is approved by
the IRB. 58 Authorization of proposed clinical research is conditioned
upon the IRB's assurance that researchers will obtain the informed
consent of each research subject prior to enrolling each subject in the
study, that researchers will disclose specific information concerning
the study, its risks and benefits, and its alternatives as part of the in-
formed consent process, and that informed consent will be docu-
mented on a written form approved by the IRB. 5 9
Several courts have ruled that these regulations, and the proce-
dures adopted by hospitals to comply with them, impose a duty on
hospitals to assure that anyone participating in research within the
hospital has received proper disclosures concerning the research and
its risks. The first of these was Eiter v. Iolab Corp,6° in which a hospital
patient consented to and received intraocular lens implants without
having first been informed that the lenses were experimental, that he
was participating in study of their safety and effectiveness, or that the
procedure carried with it both known and unknown risks. The proce-
dure damaged the patient's vision, and he sued the hospital in which
the procedure was performed, claiming failure to obtain informed
consent.61 A trial court granted the hospital's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
appealed. 62 On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed
the trial court, holding that the hospital had a duty to assure that the
patient had received the disclosures required by federal law concern-
55 See Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Kus v. Sher-
man Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214 (Il. App. Ct. 1995); Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 693 A.2d
904 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992). But see Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1989) (holding in-
formed consent claim against hospital by a research subject injured in the course of
participating in a clinical study was properly dismissed because federal research regu-
lations do not grant a private right of action).
56 See generally 21 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2005); 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2005).
57 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.111(a)(4)-(5), 46.116.
58 See id. § 46.109.
59 See id. § 46.111(a)(4)-(5).
60 607 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
61 Id. at 1111-12.
62 Friter v. Iolab Corp., No. 2306, 1990 WL 902457 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 19,
1990), rev'd, 607 A.2d 1111.
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ing the research. 63 The court reasoned that the hospital voluntarily
assumed a duty to assure that informed consent to research was ob-
tained when the hospital permitted the research to be conducted in
its facility, which triggered the application of federal research regula-
tions.64 In further support of its conclusion, the court also pointed to
the hospital's adoption of policies and procedures designed to pre-
vent research from being conducted on anyone prior to obtaining in-
formed consent.65 Finally, it distinguished earlier Pennsylvania case
law that had refused to impose disclosure duties on hospitals, indicat-
ing that none of those cases involved federally regulated research on
humans. 66
While other courts have followed the precedent set by Friter, they
have also been careful to do so only in the narrow circumstance where
federal research regulations apply. For example, courts have refused
to interpret Eriter as holding that hospitals adopting policies and pro-
cedures concerning the disclosure of treatment information assume a
duty to oversee such disclosures. 67 Similarly, courts have refused to
apply the logic of Friterwhere treatments are novel, but not provided
as part of a clinical study,68 or where devices are used for purposes
other than those for which they have received approval from the Food
and Drug Administration. 69 Thus, the cases holding that hospitals can
be held liable for failing to assure the disclosure of research risks are
based on the factual distinction between research and treatment in
hospitals and on the fact that federal law has superseded state law only
63 See 607 A.2d at 1114.
64 See id. (citing to FDA regulations and testimony of two doctors practicing at the
hospital, including the chair of the hospital's IRB).
65 See id. (noting that the operating room nurse was obligated by hospital policy
to stop any procedure involving the experimental lenses unless the consent form ap-
proved by the IRB was in the patient's chart and signed by the patient).
66 See id. at 1113.
67 This is most evident from an examination of Pennsylvania cases following
Fnter. In Boyd v. Somerset Hospital, 24 Pa. D. & C.4th 564 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1993), a
Pennsylvania trial court reversed summary judgment for a hospital on an informed
consent claim unrelated to human subjects research. It argued that Fnter recognized
that hospitals could assume a duty to oversee the process of informed consent, and
that this holding can apply outside the context of human subjects research. Id. at
574. Later, the court that had decided Fiter clarified its holding, saying that the case
applied only where the claim involved participation in federally regulated human re-
search. See Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 758 A.2d 1238, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000), aff'd, 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002).
68 See Bryant v. HCA Health Serv. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804 (Tenn. 2000)
(noting the patient was not enrolled in clinical study).
69 See id.; Staudt v. Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., 580 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1998).
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in the case of research. Accordingly, the research exception, like the
vicarious liability exception, is narrow and, despite analogies that can
be drawn between institutional oversight of both hospital-based re-
search and hospital-based treatment, the exception has not been ap-
plied outside the context of federally regulated research.
Since 1967, only two courts have broken from the traditional pol-
icy that the law does not impose on hospitals a duty of disclosure or a
duty to assure physician disclosures. Yet, neither has had, or is likely
to have, much effect on the traditional policy nationwide.
In 1987, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals of North Caro-
lina ruled that a hospital has a duty to take reasonable steps to assure
that physicians practicing in the hospital obtain the informed consent
of a hospital patient prior to treatment.7 0 In Campbell v. Pitt County
Memorial Hospital, Inc.,7 1 the plaintiffs were parents of a child injured
at birth allegedly as a result of the hospital's failure to inform the par-
ents prior to a vaginal delivery that the child was in a breech position,
that there was a choice between delivering the child vaginally or by
cesarean section, and about the relative risks of each method of deliv-
ery given the child's position in utero.7 2 Ajury had awarded a verdict
for the parents and the hospital appealed, arguing that the law does
not impose a duty on hospitals to obtain the informed consent of pa-
tients. 7-3 The court of appeals held that the doctrine of corporate neg-
ligence requires hospitals "'to make a reasonable effort to monitor
and oversee the treatment which is prescribed and administered by
physicians practicing at the facility"' and that this could encompass a
duty to assure that the informed consent of a hospital patient has
been obtained prior to treatment.7 4 Additionally, it held that there
was sufficient evidence on the record to support the jury's determina-
tion that such a duty existed in this case and was breached. 75 Specifi-
cally, the court pointed to evidence establishing that the standard of
care for nurses is to assure that patients have received an explanation
from their doctors about the nature, alternatives, and risks of pro-
70 See Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 906-08 (N.C.
Ct. App.), affd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987). Each member of a three-judge panel on
the Court of Appeals of North Carolina filed opinions in the case. The informed
consent holding is based upon the "majority" opinion byJudge Wells and the concur-
ring opinion of judge Becton.
71 352 S.E.2d 902.
72 Id. at 903-04.
73 Id. at 904.
74 Id. at 907 (quoting Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)).
75 See id. at 907-08.
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posed procedures prior to treatment.76 Moreover, it identified evi-
dence showing that the defendant hospital adopted a policy requiring
labor and delivery nurses to present patients with consent forms and
to obtain patients' signatures on those forms prior to treatment.77
One judge dissented, arguing that the corporate negligence doctrine
was not intended to force hospital personnel to intervene into the
doctor-patient relationship and therefore that there can be no duty
on the hospital with respect to informed consent.78
Campbell has had little effect in North Carolina or elsewhere.
Many courts have faced the issue addressed in Campbell since 1987,79
and yet only one court outside of North Carolina has cited Campbell,80
and none have followed its lead. There are several reasons for this.
First, the decision has been stripped of its precedential value.8' The
North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed Campbell but was evenly di-
vided about whether to affirm or overrule the court of appeals.8 2 In
the absence of a decisive vote by the supreme court, Campbell was al-
lowed to stand, but it could not be cited as binding precedent. 83 For
this reason, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina refused to rely on
Campbell when it again addressed the issue of hospital liability for in-
formed consent in 2005, turning instead to a case that pre-dated
Campbell, which had held that hospitals do not have any duties with
respect to informed consent.8 4 Second, Campbell may be limited by
the fact that the hospital had a policy specifically requiring labor and
delivery nurses to secure each patient's signature on a consent form,
which the North Carolina Court of Appeals distinguished from a hos-
pital policy requiring that someone--but not necessarily a nurse-ob-
tain the informed consent of patients prior to delivery.8 5 Third, the
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See id. at 912-13 (Orr, J., dissenting in part).
79 See cases cited supra note 38.
80 SeeJohnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797, 799, 800 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992).
81 While courts outside of North Carolina could cite to Campbell as persuasive
authority, they are less likely to do so given that the case has lost its precedential value
in its own jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 800 (refusing to rely on Campbellin part because
of its having been stripped of its precendential value).
82 See Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 362 S.E.2d 273, 276 (N.C.
1987).
83 See id.; Daniels v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 615 S.E.2d 60, 64 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005).
84 See Daniels, 615 S.E.2d at 64-65 (relying on Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.E.2d 392
(N.C. Ct. App. 1981)).
85 See id. at 64.
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corporate negligence doctrine in health care, which is the theoretical
foundation of Campbell, has been rejected or ignored by most courts
as a basis for imposing informed consent duties on hospitals, a phe-
nomenon addressed in greater detail in Part II.C of this Article.
Sherwood-Armour v. Danbury Hospital,8 6 is the second of two cases
holding that a hospital has a duty to disclose treatment information to
its patients. Like Campbell, it has limited precedential value in its own
jurisdiction, and it rests on a questionable theoretical foundation,
which likely undermines its persuasiveness in other jurisdictions.
In Sherwood-Armour a plaintiff alleged that she became infected
with HIV when she was transfused with blood supplied by the defen-
dant-hospital. She claimed that the hospital had a duty to warn her of
the risks of receiving a blood transfusion or to inform her of the op-
tion to receive blood that had been tested and confirmed to be HIV-
free.8 7 Initially, judgment had been entered for the hospital on the
grounds that the statute of limitations had expired;8 8 however, that
ruling was reversed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, and the case
was remanded. In its opinion, the supreme court had opined that a
hospital may be liable for failing to inform its patient of the risks asso-
ciated with a transfusion of blood supplied by the hospital.8 9 It did so
without addressing an earlier case in which the supreme court ruled
that hospitals do not have a duty to disclose treatment information to
their patients.90 This left the trial court stuck between two binding
and apparently conflicting precedents when, on remand, the hospital
again moved for summary judgment, this time arguing that Connecti-
cut law does not impose a duty of disclosure on hospitals. 9 1 The court,
in an effort to honor both precedents, attempted to craft a narrow
exception to the rule that hospitals do not have a duty to disclose
treatment information. 92 It held that a hospital has a duty to warn of
defects in the products it supplies to its patients when it knows of
those defects and yet cannot correct them, which, the court said, is
distinguishable from a duty to inform patients generally of risks associ-
86 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 659 (Super. Ct. 2003).
87 Id. at 659.
88 Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., No. CV 960324786S, 1998 WL 867248 (Conn.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 1998), affd in part, revd in part, 746 A.2d 730 (Conn. 2000), remanded
to 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 659.
89 746 A.2d at 737.
90 See Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990).
91 Shenood-Armour, 35 Conn. L. Rptr. at 659.
92 The court described its effort as one to "reconcile" the two binding precedents,
rather than to craft an exception, but it later admitted that its ruling erodes the policy
against imposing informed consent duties on hospitals. Id. at 660 & 662 n.4. Thus, I
interpret the court's effort as creating as narrow an exception as possible.
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ated with treatment services rendered in the hospital.93 Thus, accord-
ing to the court, a hospital supplies its patient with a defective product
when it provides that patient with blood it knows has not been tested
for HIV.94 In essence, the court held that a rule against imposing
informed consent duties on hospitals should not be read to abrogate
standard principles of product liability. The court then denied the
hospital's motion for summary judgment, holding that a question of
fact exists about whether tested blood was available to the hospital at
the time of the transfusion.9 5
Sherwood-Armour was decided in 2003, and there has been little
time during which to examine its persuasiveness.9 6 Nonetheless, there
are two reasons to predict that it will have little effect on informed
consent policy. First, it is a trial court decision and thus is not binding
on any other court in Connecticut. Second, it is based on product
liability principles, which courts have been reluctant to apply to hospi-
tals because they have not considered hospitals to be like other manu-
facturers, distributors, or retailers that introduce products into the
marketplace. 97
In summary, the rule against imposing disclosure duties on hospi-
tals persists based on an underlying goal of preventing third parties
from intruding into the delicate relationship between doctor and pa-
tient. While exceptions exist, they are of narrow application.
C. The Uncertain Duty of Hospitals To Prevent Unauthorized Treatment
of Patients
Courts have been somewhat less reluctant to recognize a duty for
hospitals to protect their patients from nonconsensual treatment than
they have been to impose disclosure duties. Since 1982, at least nine
cases have ruled on the issue of whether hospitals have a duty to as-
sure that a patient has provided consent prior to treatment.98 Three
93 See id. at 660-61.
94 See id.
95 Id. at 661.
96 None of the eight cases decided in 2004 or 2005 have cited to Shenood-Armour.
See Gotlin v. Lederman, 367 F. Supp. 2d 349 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Foster v. Traul, 120 P.3d
278 (Idaho 2005); Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 N.E.2d 1078 (I11. App. Ct. 2004);
Mohsan v. Roule-Graham, 907 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Bailey v. Owens, 793
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 2005); Daniels v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 615 S.E.2d 60
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Long v. Jaszczak, 688 N.W.2d 173 (N.D. 2004); Newell v. Tri-
dent Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 2004).
97 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 356-66 (5th ed. 2004).
98 All but one of these cases were decided in 1992 or later. See Marsh v. Crawford
Long Hosp. of Emory Univ., 444 S.E.2d 357 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Auler v. Van Natta,
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of these cases have held that such a duty exists.9 9 In each of these
three cases, patients claimed that the defendant-hospitals failed to
protect them from receiving surgical procedures to which they did not
consent.1 '0 The court in each case recognized that while only physi-
cians have a duty to obtain patients' informed consent, hospitals have
a duty to reasonably protect their patients from nonconsensual treat-
686 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Mohsan v. Roule-Graham, 907 So. 2d 804 (La.
Ct. App. 2005); Kelley v Kitahama, 675 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Johnson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Urban v. Spohn Hosp., 869
S.W.2d 450 (Tex. App. 1993); Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); Montalvo
v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002); Mathias v. St. Catherine's Hosp.,
Inc., 569 N.W.2d 330 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
Another four courts addressed the issue in dicta. Of these, two suggested that
hospitals have a duty to assure that the patient has authorized the scheduled treat-
ment, implicitly recognizing a distinction between a duty to assure disclosures and a
duty to assure authorization of the scheduled procedure. See Winters v. Podzamsky,
621 N.E.2d 72, 76 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); Krout v. Martin, 50 Pa. D. & C.3d 472, 476-77
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1989). The other two stated that no such duty exists. Petriello v.
Kulman, 576 A.2d 474, 478-79 (Conn. 1990); Boney v. Mother Frances Hosp., 880
S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App. 1994). None of them provided any explanation.
Additionally, one state statute distinguishes between the medical task of provid-
ing disclosures to patients and the ministerial task of documenting consent. See
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4306 (2005) (repealed 2005) (ministerial task of recording
consent is not the practice of medicine).
Interestingly, Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914),
abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), is one of the earliest no consent
claims pursued against a hospital. Despite being heralded for vindicating the right of
patients to be free of unwanted medical treatment, the Schloendorff court refused to
impose a duty on the defendant-hospital to prevent the nonconsensual treatment of
one of its patients. The case involved a patient who received extensive surgery despite
having consented only to an exploratory procedure. Id. at 93. She sued the hospital
for medical battery. While the court refused to apply the charitable immunity doc-
trine to the claim, it nonetheless held that the hospital could not be held liable be-
cause the physicians who allegedly treated her were not subject to the hospital's
control and because the nurse who knew that the patient had consented only to ex-
ploratory surgery was not present at the surgery and thus did not have reason to know
that the physicians would exceed the bounds of the patient's consent. Id. at 93-95.
99 See Marsh, 444 S.E.2d 357; Urban, 869 S.W.2d 450; Mathias, 569 N.W.2d 330; see
also Douglass v. Florence Gen. Hosp., 259 S.E.2d 117 (S.C. 1979) (suggesting that
such a duty exists in the course of addressing whether the case should be dismissed on
the basis of the charitable immunity doctrine).
100 See Marsh, 444 S.E.2d 357 (discussing a patient who had consented to abdomi-
nal liposuction and complains she received a more invasive and scarring procedure
without her consent); Urban, 869 S.W.2d 450 (reviewing plaintiff's contention that,
while anesthetized for other consensual surgery, she received a hemorrhoidectomy
she had specifically refused); Mathias, 569 N.W.2d 330 (involving a plaintiff who al-
leged that she was sterilized without her consent while still anesthetized following
childbirth).
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ment, which includes identifying and reporting to patients' physicians
any discrepancies between scheduled procedures and procedures for
which consent has been obtained. 10 1 This, they held, arises not from
the informed consent doctrine but from simple negligence principles
as applied to hospitals. 10 2
Consider, for example, the ruling in Urban v. Spohn Hospital103
where the patient, while anesthetized for other consensual surgical
procedures, received a hemorrhoidectomy that she had specifically re-
fused several times in conversations with more than one hospital
nurse. Despite their awareness of the patient's refusals, and their
knowledge that the patient was scheduled for a hemorrhoidectomy,
none of the hospital's nurses notified the patient's physician or any
hospital supervisor that the patient had refused one of the procedures
that she was scheduled to receive. The patient sued the hospital,
claiming that it acted negligently in failing to assure that she received
only those treatments to which she had consented. 10 4 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the hospital on the theory that, under
Texas law, hospitals do not owe patients any duty with respect to in-
formed consent.'0 5 The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the law does not prohibit imposing a duty on hospitals concern-
ing informed consent, and it remanded the case for further factual
proceedings. 10 6 In so ruling, the court distinguished precedent that
refused to impose on hospitals a duty to obtain informed consent.' 0 7
It did so by differentiating between a claim of failure to obtain in-
formed consent and a claim of simple negligence. It wrote:
101 See Marsh, 444 S.E.2d at 358 (reversing grant of summaryjudgment for hospital
based on the existence of a duty); Urban, 869 S.W.2d at 452-53 (reversing summary
judgment for the hospital and remanding the case for further proceedings based on
existence of duty); Mathias, 569 N.W.2d at 335 (recognizing the duty in the course of
holding that the hospital satisfied its duty when its nurse discovered and reported to
the patient's attending physician that there was no signed consent form for the proce-
dure the physician was planning to perform).
102 See Marsh, 444 S.E.2d at 358 (holding that the duty arises from the general duty
of hospitals to exercise reasonable care in protecting their patients, and that responsi-
bility for breach of this duty does not transfer to the attending physician where the
breach resulted from conduct of a hospital's nurse in the course of carrying out ad-
ministrative tasks); Urban, 869 S.W.2d at 452-53 (holding that the duty arises from
ordinary negligence principles applicable to the hospital); Mathias, 569 N.W.2d at
334-35 (considering whether a duty arises under a "theory of forseeability" and not
under an informed consent theory).
103 869 S.W.2d 450.
104 Id. at 451-52.
105 See id. at 452.
106 See id. at 452-53.
107 See id. (distinguishing Ritter v. Delaney, 790 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1990)).
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[The patient's] pleadings stated a cause of action for negligence on
the part of the hospital apart from the alleged failure to obtain consent.
We cannot say as a matter of law that merely because the physician
is ultimately responsible for obtaining consent for medical proce-
dures, that a hospital is therefore totally insulated from liability for
all acts relating to such procedures.1 0 8
The court went on to decide that negligence principles may impose a
duty on the hospital, through its nurses, to reasonably assure that pa-
tients are not provided with treatments to which they have not
consented.1 09
In contrast, the common thread running through the cases in
which courts refused to impose on hospitals a duty to protect patients
from nonconsensual treatment"0 is that no distinction is made be-
tween the duty to disclose treatment information and the duty to ob-
tain consent prior to treatment.II In Cross v. Trapp,1I 2 for example,
the patient claimed that a hospital failed to prevent a surgeon from
providing a procedure that went beyond the scope of the patient's
consent.' 1 3 The West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the hospital
had no duty to "obtain consent" because such a duty would force hos-
pitals to disrupt ongoing conversations between doctors and patients
about treatments.1 14 The court's reasoning indicates that it may have
misunderstood the duty at issue. By attempting to protect the conver-
sations through which doctors disclose treatment information prior to
seeking a patient's consent, the court signaled that it perceived the
relevant issue to be whether hospitals had a duty to intervene in the
disclosure process. Thus, it did not address whether the hospital had
a duty to assure that, after the disclosure process is complete the pa-
tient has actually agreed to receive the treatment about to be pro-
vided. Such a duty would not interfere with the disclosure process.
108 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
109 See id. ("Nor can we say that ordinary prudence would not require some in-
quiry by a nurse into the correctness of performing a surgical procedure over the
direct, unambiguous, verbal objection of the patient.").
110 The duty to protect hospital patients from nonconsensual treatments is also
referred to as a duty for hospitals to document consent and a duty to assure that
physicians obtain consent prior to treatment.
111 See Auler v. Van Natta, 686 N.E.2d 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Mohsan v. Roule-
Graham, 907 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Kelley v. Kitahama, 675 So. 2d 1181 (La.
Ct. App. 1996);Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992);
Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982); Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
112 294 S.E.2d 446.
113 Id. at 449.
114 See id. at 472.
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At times, courts have been distracted by a claimed distinction be-
tween a hospital's "obtaining" informed consent and "assuring" that a
physician has obtained informed consent. This has led some courts to
focus on whether there is an institutional responsibility to assure that
adequate disclosures have been made, rather than the relevant ques-
tion of whether there is an institutional responsibility to assure that
patients have authorized treatment at all. For example, in Johnson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,1 1 5 a patient claimed that he received a blood
transfusion without his authorization, and he sued the hospital, claim-
ing that it had breached a duty to protect him from nonconsensual
treatments within its facility.1 16 A trial court dismissed the claim on
the grounds that, as a matter of law, hospitals do not have informed
consent duties. 1 7 The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed." 18 De-
spite facing a claim of no consent, the court based its holding on rea-
sons that apply to claims that a hospital has failed to provide sufficient
treatment information."l 9 It reasoned that hospitals lack the expertise
to determine the patient's condition, the treatment options, and the
risks and benefits of those options, all of which are necessary for suffi-
cient disclosure. 20 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged that the
plaintiff claimed a separate duty for hospitals to assure that a patient's
consent has been obtained prior to treatment. 12' Yet, this did not
cure the court's confusion. Instead, the court interpreted the duty as
one requiring hospitals to assure not only that consent exists, but also
that it was sufficiently informed. This is apparent from the court's
rationale for rejecting the claimed duty. It reasoned that if a hospital
does not have a duty to disclose treatment information to patients,
then it should not have a duty to ensure that someone else has done
so. It wrote that "there would be little reason to impose a duty to
ensure that someone else had obtained consent if there was no corre-
sponding duty to advise the patient of relevant, relative risks and bene-
fits or otherwise obtain an informed consent upon determining that
he or she had not yet given one."'122
With so few cases addressing the issue of whether hospitals have a
duty to protect their patients from nonconsensual treatment, and with
such apparent confusion among courts about the difference between
115 832 P.2d 797.
116 Id. at 797.
117 Id. at 798.
118 Id. at 797.
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that duty and the duty of disclosure, it is difficult to identify a trend
that helps to predict the likelihood that courts will recognize such a
duty in the future. On the one hand, it is likely that, over time, the
flawed logic of earlier decisions will be identified and corrected by
courts facing the same issue in the future. This could mean that
courts will be more willing to recognize the duty once they discover
that it can be reconciled with precedents refusing to impose a duty on
hospitals to assure the sufficiency of treatment disclosures. On the
other hand, the most recent court to address the question of whether
a hospital has a duty to protect its patients from nonconsensual treat-
ments rejected it outright with no analysis, suggesting an unwilling-
ness to examine flaws in earlier decisions. 123
In summary, hospitals are virtually immune from liability related
to claims for treatment based on insufficiently informed consent and
claims for treatment without any consent. For nearly forty years,
courts have consistently rejected arguments that hospitals have a duty
to provide patients with treatment information sufficient to enable in-
formed decisionmaking or to assure that patients' physicians do so,
recognizing only narrow exceptions in the case of federally regulated
human subjects research and in cases where the hospital employs the
physician whose disclosures were deficient. Courts in a few jurisdic-
tions have recognized a more limited duty for hospitals to assure that
patients have consented to the treatments they are scheduled to re-
ceive, without regard to how well informed those consents were. Yet,
the majority of courts addressing the existence of even this more lim-
ited duty have rejected it. Throughout this forty-year period, the pre-
vailing rationale has been that the process of disclosure and consent is
both complex and delicate, requiring medical expertise and commu-
nication skills that only a physician possesses. According to this logic,
the law should not impose a duty on hospitals to become involved in
the informed consent process because hospitals are not competent to
do so and would only cause harm by meddling in it.
The remainder of this Article challenges the wisdom of the law's
policy against imposing informed consent duties on hospitals. It iden-
tifies the fallacies on which the policy is based as well as the degree to
which the policy is out of step with the clinical reality of hospital in-
volvement in informed consent. In so doing, this Article also identi-
fies the value of hospital participation in informed consent and
proposes institutional informed consent duties designed to harness
that value in a manner that also promotes accountability.
123 See Mohsan v. Roule-Graham, 907 So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
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At the same time, the current policy against imposing informed
consent duties on hospitals has survived four decades of intense scru-
tiny, and it has done so despite changes in both informed consent law
and the general legal responsibility of hospitals to safeguard their pa-
tients. Thus, this Article predicts that any proposal to recognize insti-
tutional informed consent duties will fail unless there is a better
understanding of why the policy has survived. This Article then takes
on the task of both identifying a reason for the policy's survival and
accounting for that reason as part of the project to reform the law's
policy.
II. THE POLICY'S MYSTERIOUS PERSISTENCE
The law's policy against imposing informed consent duties on
hospitals is unsustainable because it is founded on several fallacies. It
presumes that hospitals have not yet inserted themselves into the in-
formed consent process, that the process is uniquely tailored to meet
the individual needs of each patient, and that every aspect of the pro-
cess requires medical expertise and delicate professional judgment
that cannot be standardized. As discussed below, these assumptions
are simply wrong, and they have been wrong for quite some time. As a
result, the law has failed to encourage institutional behavior that
could improve the efficiency and quality of informed consent, and it
has permitted hospitals to intervene in the informed consent process
without sufficient accountability.
Accordingly, this portion of this Article proposes institutional in-
formed consent duties designed to redistribute responsibility for the
informed consent process. These institutional duties include (1) a
duty to require that physicians on staff obtain the informed consent of
their patients prior to any treatments provided at the hospital, (2) a
duty to assure that no treatment is provided in the hospital without
prior verification that the patient has provided an informed consent
to the proposed treatment, (3) a duty for hospitals to include in their
quality assurance programs the monitoring of informed consent prac-
tices and outcomes, (4) a duty to assure that any treatment informa-
tion disseminated by hospitals to patients is accurate, complete,
understandable, and equally accessible to all similarly situated hospital
patients, and (5) a duty to assure that any hospital employees assisting
patients in the post-disclosure, decisionmaking process are qualified
to provide such assistance and that they are reasonably available to
patients when needed.
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A. The Policy's Persistence Despite the Role of Hospitals in the Informed
Consent Process
One of the fallacies on which the law bases its determination that
hospitals are not subject to informed consent liability is its assessment
that hospitals are not involved in the informed consent process. De-
spite the fact that hospitals are responsible for coordinating complex
medical treatment for their patients, the law regards hospitals as
merely the facility in which medical decisionmaking takes place be-
tween a doctor and a patient. For example, in Cox v. Haworth,124 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the exclusive role of the
hospital in which a patient was injured from contrast dye injected into
him by his physician was to "provide facilities and support personnel"
to the patient's attending physician. 125 Accordingly, it ruled that the
hospital had no duties related to the patient's allegedly receiving
treatment without his informed consent. 126 Remarkably, the Cox
court's determination about the nonexistent role of hospitals in the
informed consent process appears irreconcilable with its observation
only paragraphs before that the role of modern hospitals has ex-
panded. Quoting an opinion adopted by the court only one year ear-
lier, it wrote, "'l[p] rior to modern times, a hospital undertook, "only
to furnish room, food, facilities for operation, and attendants".... In
contrast, today's hospitals regulate their medical staffs to a much
greater degree and play a much more active role in furnishing pa-
tients medical treatment. '" 127 Despite recognizing the expanded role
of hospitals, the court did not address whether the record contained
information about the role actually played by the defendant-hospital
with respect to informed consent in the plaintiff's case. It simply pre-
sumed that informed consent was excluded from the modernization
of hospital functions. 128
Despite the law's view that hospitals are not and shall not be part
of the informed consent process, they are deeply involved. Moreover,
124 283 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
125 Id. at 395.
126 Id. at 395-96.
127 Id. at 395 (quoting Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980)).
128 Id. As a technical matter the court examined the newly adopted doctrine of
direct corporate liability for hospitals and found that overseeing the informed con-
sent process was not among the enumerated duties listed in support of corporate
liability doctrine when it was adopted. See id. Thus, it refused to apply that doctrine.
See id. It did not reach the larger policy question about why the court was unwilling to
interpret a duty to assure informed consent as another example of hospitals' more
expansive role that justifies the general corporate duty of hospitals to safeguard
patients.
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as demonstrated below, the role of hospitals in informed consent has
expanded consistently since the early 1970s.
Virtually every hospital in the country has policies and proce-
dures to assure that the informed consent of their patients is obtained
prior to treatment. In part, this is because the nation's private accred-
iting organization for hospitals, the Joint Commission for the Accredi-
tation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), requires such policies
as a condition of accreditation. 129 That hospitals adopt informed con-
sent policies and procedures in informed consent case law also is con-
sistent with references to those policies and procedures.130 Similarly,
hospitals routinely develop their own consent forms that physicians
practicing in those hospitals use for the purpose of recording con-
sent. 131 The forms often contain a hospital's name or logo and may
even recite the hospital's policy to require evidence of informed con-
sent prior to treatment. 132 There is even evidence that as long as
twenty years ago, hospitals were purchasing pre-fabricated, informed
consent forms from outside vendors. For example, a 1984 opinion of
the Missouri Court of Appeals refers to an expert witness who "oper-
ates a business which produces and sells consent forms to
hospitals."133
Even when faced with such facts, however, courts generally are
not persuaded that any informed consent duty can be imposed on
hospitals. For example, in Petriello v. Kalman,'34 a physician operated
on a patient even after the physician and a nurse had discovered pre-
operatively that the then sedated patient had yet to sign the hospital's
informed consent form. 135 Moreover, he did so in direct violation of a
hospital policy that forbids sedation or treatment unless the form has
129 SeeJOINT COMM'N FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., 2003 COM-
PREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS TX 5.2-5.2.2 (2003) [hereinafter
JOINT COMM'N].
130 See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Butler v. S. Fulton
Med. Ctr., Inc., 452 S.E.2d 768 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Daniels v. Durham County Hosp.
Corp., 615 S.E.2d 60, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
131 See, e.g., Roberson v. Menorah Med. Ctr., 588 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979) (detailing a hospital's administrative adoption and distribution of consent
forms); see also M. Bottrell et al., Hospital Informed Consent for Procedure Forms: Facilitat-
ing Quality Patient-Physician Interaction, 135 ARCHIVES SURGERY 26 (2000) (containing a
study that gathered consent forms from 157 hospitals).
132 See, e.g., Auler v. Van Natta, 686 N.E.2d 172, 173 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
133 Ackerman v. Lerwick, 676 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
134 576 A.2d 474.
135 Id. at 476.
[VOL. 81:41234
INFORMED CONSENT LIABILITY FOR HOSPITALS
been executed.1 36 After holding that the law does not generally im-
pose informed consent duties on hospitals, the court ruled that the
existence and violation of the hospital's informed consent policy,
while relevant to the existence of an informed consent duty, was insuf-
ficient to establish the duty.137 The Connecticut Supreme Court rea-
soned that, by adopting the policy, the hospital merely "'sought to
increase the likelihood that doctors would warn patients."",i 8 Other
courts in other jurisdictions have ruled similarly.1 9
The law's effort to explain away these practices is weak. First,
courts fail to acknowledge that hospitals first adopted informed con-
sent policies in the early 1970s to appease frustrated health care con-
sumers, not physicians.' 40 On the heels of the civil and welfare rights
movements, consumers in the late 1960s and early 1970s employed
the strategies of political activism (e.g., sit-ins, picket lines, and protest
rallies) against hospitals in major U.S. cities and at meetings of the
JCAHO. 14 1 They protested, among other things, the failure of hospi-
tals to protect patients from being treated without their consent and
to assure that patients receive sufficient and understandable treat-
ment information so as to make informed treatment decisions. 142
Consumers succeeded in forcing JCAHO and the American Hospital
Association to endorse specific rights for hospital patients, including
the right to refuse treatment and the right to receive understandable
treatment information. 143 This is the genesis of JCAHO's historical
and current accreditation requirements concerning informed con-
sent. Thus, the claim that hospitals' informed consent policies and
forms are directed at the hospitals' physicians and not their patients is
undercut by material evidence that these policies and forms were orig-
inally created to protect consumers in informed consent process. In
short, those policies and forms are evidence of a public policy for hos-
pitals to intervene in the doctor-patient relationship, especially in mat-
ters related to informed consent.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 479.
138 Id. (quoting Mele v. Sherman Hosp., 838 F.2d 923, 925 (7th Cir. 1988)).
139 See, e.g., Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Newell v.
Trident Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 2004).
140 See FADEN & BEAucnAMP, supra note 8, at 93-95; Robert Gatter, Faith, Confi-
dence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REVx.
395, 423-24 (2004).
141 See Gatter, supra note 140, at 423-24.
142 See id.
143 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 93-95.
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Beyond policies and forms, hospitals also assign employees to par-
ticipate in the informed consent process, and their responsibilities
have expanded over time. Nurses, in particular, have been assigned
the task of providing patients with consent forms, obtaining their sig-
natures on those forms, placing signed forms into patients' charts,
and confirming that evidence of consent exists prior to performing
scheduled procedures. 144 Yet, the standard of care for nurses with re-
spect to informed consent appears to have moved beyond simply re-
cording evidence of consent. It now includes assuring that physicians
have provided treatment information to patients prior to consent. In
Campbell v. Pitt County Memorial Hospital, Inc.,' 45 for example, testi-
mony was taken from an expert about the nursing standard of care for
informed consent: "Explaining the risk of alternative procedures
would be the responsibility of the physician[;] [a]ssuring that the pa-
tient has had an explanation would be the responsibility of the
nurse."1 46 Additionally, the Code of Ethics of the American Nurses'
Association has been interpreted to require that nurses answer pa-
tients' questions concerning their treatments and otherwise assure
that patients understand the treatment decisions they make. 147 More-
over, a recent examination of the burdens of medical decisionmaking
on modern patients, published in the New York Times, reveals that hos-
pitals employ "patient advocates" to help patients make sense of treat-
ment information they receive and to provide guidance as patients
make difficult treatment choices.1 48 Thus, hospital employees partici-
pate not only in the ministerial tasks of informed consent, but also in
the process of providing understandable treatment information and
aiding each patient to make medical decisions based on that
information.
Again, despite indisputable evidence that hospital employees are
increasingly involved in the informed consent process the law has not
altered its policy against enforcing informed consent duties on hospi-
tals. Some courts have ruled that the "borrowed servant" doctrine
shields a hospital from liability for its nurses' mistakes in the informed
144 See, e.g., id.; see also Krout v. Martin, 50 Pa. D. & C.3d 472, 473 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1.
1989) (containing example of consent forms administered by a nurse).
145 352 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App.), affd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987).
146 Id. at 908 (alterations in original).
147 See Susanne A. Quallich, The Practice of Informed Consent, 17 DERMATOLOGY
NURSING 49, 51 (2005).
148 SeeJan Hoffman, Getting Help: Patients Turn to Advocates, Support Groups and E-
mail, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, at A19.
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consent process. 149 In Ritter v. Delaney,15 0 for example, a plaintiff at-
tempted to argue that the treating physician was an agent of the de-
fendant-hospital and, as evidence of the agency relationship, pointed
to the hospital's having provided the physician with a nurse employed
by the hospital to provide assistance in obtaining a patient's consent
to treatment.' 5 ' The court's response suggests that the hospital insu-
lates itself from liability for a nurse's role in the informed consent
doctrine where the nurse is a hospital servant "borrowed" by a physi-
cian. It wrote:
We fail to see how the hospital relinquishing control of the nurse to
Dr. Manning would impose any duty upon the hospital to obtain the
informed consent of the patient.
We also fail to see how Dr. Manning ordering the nurse to have the
patient sign a hospital permit to operate amounts to the appellee
hospital taking on a non-delegable duty from the physician, thereby im-
posing a duty upon the hospital to obtain the informed consent of
the patient .... 152
Other courts have reasoned that nurses are not physicians and thus
lack the medical expertise that justifies the law's imposing an in-
formed consent duty.153
The weakness of the law's reasoning is apparent. Courts fail to
account for evidence that an independent standard of care exists for
nurses with respect to informed consent, which includes assuring that
the patient has spoken to the treating physician about treatment risks
and alternatives, that the patient understands the information that has
been provided, and that the patient consents to treatment.1 54 This
standard of care is evidenced both by the actual practices of nurses
and by nursing experts.1 55
149 But see Butler v. S. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc., 452 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a nurse performing ministerial task of recording a patient's con-
sent on a form is not a "borrowed servant"); Marsh v. Crawford Long Hosp. of Emory
Univ., 444 S.E.2d 357, 358 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (same); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
4306 (2005) (repealed 2005) (stating that the ministerial work of recording informed
consent is not the practice of medicine).
150 790 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App. 1990).
151 See id. at 32.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Wells v. Storey, 792 So. 2d 1034, 1039 (Ala. 1999). But see supra Part
I.C (describing cases in which courts have imposed a duty on hospitals, through their
nurses, to identify and report any discrepancies between the procedure to which the
patient has consented and the scheduled procedure).
154 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
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The evidence of hospital involvement in the informed consent
process discussed to this point has appeared in case law. Yet, there is
substantially more evidence that the law has not yet been forced to
account for.
Hospitals have become direct suppliers of treatment information
to patients through actual and virtual patient libraries. Many stock
and staff "resource centers," providing patients with books, videos, au-
dio tapes, and access to online materials designed to educate them
about their conditions and treatment options.1 56 More recently,
brick-and-mortar patient libraries have given way to virtual ones.
Some hospitals develop, through their medical staffs, disease-specific
information for patients as well as "decision aids" designed to assist
patients sort through treatment information so as to reach personal-
ized decisions,1 57 which are then posted online. 15 8 Other hospitals
pay for access to large commercial databases designed to provide the
same kinds of information and assistance. Healthwise is an example
of one such database, and it boasts having contracts with "hundreds of
hospitals" to provide online health information to patients.1 59
To this point, hospitals have been depicted as having interjected
themselves into the informed consent process by enforcing policies
and procedures, by providing consent forms, by employing personnel
to assure that informed consent has been obtained and is sufficiently
recorded, and by supplying supplemental treatment information to
patients. Because of newly developed, computerized informed con-
sent platforms, however, such piecemeal involvement is already giving
way to a new paradigm in which hospitals are the comprehensive man-
agers of the informed consent process.
156 See Miller, supra note 6, at 1036-37.
157 A decision aid is a tool to assist an individual identify his treatment preferences
based on his goals and degree of risk aversion. Thus, decision aids are different from
brochures and other media that provide disease and treatment information to pa-
tients. Rather than informing a patient's treatment choice, a decision aid helps pa-
tients make choices in the face of medical uncertainty. For more information on
decision aids, see generally John Billings, Promoting the Dissemination of Decision Aids:
An Odyssey in a Dysfunctional Health Care Financing System, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004, at
129, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cg/content/abstract/hlthaff.var.
128v; Annette M. O'Connor et al., Modifying Unwarranted Variations in Health Care:
Shared Decision Making Using Patient Decision Aids, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 7, 2004, at 63,
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/cotent/abstract/hlthaff.var.63vl.
158 For example, see the "decision guides" adopted and disseminated by the Mayo
Clinic, available at http://mayoclinic.com/health/TreatmentDecisionlndep/Treat-
mentDecisionlndex.
159 See Healthwise, supra note 6.
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Several businesses have produced and are selling to hospitals
electronic informed consent applications.1 60  Each application at-
tempts to provide patients with information about their particular
conditions and their proposed medical treatments using understanda-
ble language and a medium which patients can refer back to at a later
time. For example, iMedConsent provides online treatment informa-
tion in written form, which can be viewed electronically or printed on
paper.1 61 Another product-Emmi-is a narrated slide show combin-
ing graphics and written text, which can be accessed repeatedly online
or printed.1 62 These products provide information at a deliberate
pace so that patients can better absorb it. So, for example, the Emmi
presentation on c-section takes about thirty minutes to view. 163 Fur-
thermore, the information provided by each application is designed
to satisfy disclosure duties. Each addresses the risks associated with a
proposed procedure as well as risks and benefits of the alternative
treatments. Each also documents a general consent to a procedure
and an acknowledgment of each of its associated risks. For example,
iMedConsent generates online consent forms that include a list of the
specific risks, and it then records an electronic patient signature. 64
Emmi, on the other hand, prompts patients to acknowledge the expla-
nation of risks one by one with a mouse click, and each acknowledg-
ment is separately recorded and stored electronically.165 Finally, none
of the applications are designed to replace one-on-one consultation
between patient and physician. Rather, each is designed to educate
160 See, e.g., Dialog Medical, iMedConsent, http://www.dialogmedical.com (last
visited Feb. 8, 2006) (marketing the iMedConsent application); PrivaComp,
PrivaSure, http://ww.privacomp.com/privasure.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (mar-
keting PrivaSure informed consent system); Rightfield Solutions, Product Demo,
http://rightfield.net/demo.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2006) (marketing the expecta-
tion management medical information (Emmi) system); VisionTree, Healthcare On-
line, http://www.visiontree.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/products.healthcare (last
visited Feb. 8, 2006) (marketing VisionTree Healthcare Online).
161 See Dialog Medical, iMedConsent Enterprise, http://www.dialogmedical.com/
enterprise.htm# (follow "Sample Documents" hyperlink at the bottom of the page)
(last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
162 See Rightfield Solutions, supra note 160 (providing several procedure-specific
demonstrations).
163 See id. (follow "C-section" hyperlink under "Product Demo"). While the dem-
onstration lasts about five minutes, it is clear from a sample screen recording aspects
of the patient's interaction with the application that the entire presentation is quite
lengthy.
164 See Dialog Medical, supra note 161 (follow "Sample Documents" hyperlink at
the bottom of the page).
165 See Rightfield Solutions, supra note 160 (follow any one of several hyperlinks
for procedure-specific demonstrations).
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patients concentrating on the basics of a proposed treatment, which
allows doctors to focus on the unique informational needs of a partic-
ular patient.
Recent news suggests that these automated, electronic informed
consent applications have piqued the interest of hospitals. As men-
tioned in the introduction to this Article, the Veterans Affairs has
completed its installation of iMedConsent at each of its 162 medical
centers. 166 Additionally, in July 2005, the makers of VisionTree
Healthcare announced that the product was being piloted by a cancer
center in Maryland, and that the system "has been successfully imple-
mented at sites around the country in the fields of oncology for [gyne-
cology], breast and prostate cancer, as well as neurosurgery, spine
surgery, cardiology and orthopedics... includ [ing at] UCLA Medical
Center, Saint Luke's Hospital Kansas City, Vantage Oncology and Bay-
lor College of Medicine." 167 Similarly, a flagship medical center in a
New York chain of hospitals, as well as a seventeen-hospital system as-
sociated with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center are piloting
the Emmi system. 168 Moreover, an industry analysis by KPMG con-
firms a trend among hospitals to employ online, automated informed
consent applications as a way of managing both liability risks and pa-
tients' expectations. 169
To be clear, the role of a hospital in the informed consent pro-
cess changes fundamentally when it employs one of the automated
informed consent policies and processes described above. No longer
does the hospital merely encourage or even assure that physicians
have obtained informed consent prior to treatment. Instead, the hos-
pital manages the entire process of disclosing standard treatment in-
formation and securing consent, leaving their physicians in control of
answering remaining patient questions and otherwise addressing in-
formational needs of particular patients that deviate from the norm.
This new managerial role for hospitals is even more apparent
from the role hospitals may play in assisting patients to process treat-
ment information and to arrive at a treatment decision that reflects
each patient's preferences.170 Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center,
166 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
167 See Press Release, VisionTree, Holy Cross Hospital Implements VisionTree
Healthcare To Help Patients Make Informed Treatment Decisions (July 18, 2005),
available at http://www.visiontree.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/newsevents.healthcare.
168 See Merli, supra note 5.
169 See id.
170 In addition to the example described here, see supra note 148 and accompany-
ing text for a description of hospitals' use of patient advocates as medical decision-
making counselors.
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for example, has a Center for Shared Decision Making, which employs
personal counselors to help patients sort through treatment informa-
tion and make decisions that reflect their preferences. 171 The Center
is staffed by nurse-counselors and overseen by a member of the hospi-
tal's medical staff.1 72 It also houses brochures and videos commonly
associated with a hospital's patient resource center.1 73
A managerial role for hospitals in the informed consent process,
while a relatively new concept in the evolving relationship between
hospitals and the patients they treat, is not new in the relationship
between hospitals and human subjects who participate in medical re-
search. As noted earlier, federal law since the 1970s has required in-
stitutions in which human subjects research is conducted to oversee
the entire process by which individuals (often patients) consent to
participate in such research, which includes approving substantive dis-
closures made to potential research subjects and the form on which
those disclosures are made and on which consent is recorded.1 74 Ac-
cordingly, there is precedent-both clinical precedent and legal pre-
cedent-for substantial institutional oversight of the informed
consent process.
Thus, the law's policy against imposing informed consent duties
on hospitals is based on an antiquated view that hospitals are merely
the facilities in which medical decisionmaking takes place at the sole
direction of independent physicians. Not only is this view inconsistent
with clinical reality, but it also leads to an irresponsible policy of per-
mitting hospitals to participate in the informed consent process with-
out any legal accountability. Thus, we are left to hope that market
forces are sufficient to assure that the potential social value of institu-
tional oversight of informed consent is, in fact, realized.
While the expanding role of hospitals in the informed consent
process is evidence of how antiquated the law's policy is, it is also evi-
dence of the policy's staying power. In other words, the policy has
proven resistant to change based on evolving clinical practices. Ac-
cordingly, while it may be difficult to imagine how the policy can sur-
171 See Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Center for Shared Decisions Making
[hereinafter Dartmouth-Hitchcock, About], http://www.dhmc.org/webpage.cfm?site
_id=2&org__id=108&gsec-id=0&sec id=0&item-id=2486 (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
The Center is closely associated with organizations that research and develop decision
aids. See Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., Our Staff [hereinafter Dartmouth-Hitch-
cock, Our Staff], http://www.dhmc.org/webpage.cfm?site-id=2&org-id=108&morg_
id=0&sec-id=0&gsec-id13223&itemid=13223 (last visted Feb. 4, 2006).
172 See Dartmouth-Hitchcock, Our Staff, supra note 171.
173 See Dartmouth-Hitchcock, About, supra note 171.
174 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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vive the most recent trend among hospitals to implement automated
informed consent applications, the policy's lasting power despite such
changes in the past suggests otherwise. This is all the more apparent
given that the policy, in addition to surviving changes in clinical prac-
tice, has also weathered substantial changes in the law's conception of
medical expertise and institutional liability. This is explored next.
B. The Policy's Persistence Despite the Law's Rethinking Expertise and
Standardization in Informed Consent
At the foundation of the law's policy against imposing informed
consent duties on hospitals is the erroneous claim that managing the
informed consent process requires a physician's knowledge and skills
and, thus, that the law should protect the process against interference
by those outside of the medical profession, including hospitals. 175
The claim can be broken down into two parts. First is the claim of
technical, medical expertise. According to this claim, only a physician
can provide the necessary disclosures to patients because only physi-
cians have the expert ability to determine and explain a patient's diag-
nosis, prognosis, and treatment options, as well as the risks and
benefits of those options. 176 Likewise, only the treating physician has
access to a patient's medical history and other information about the
patient's condition, which is needed to determine what treatment in-
formation may be uniquely important to that patient. 177
In contrast, the second claim concerns skills for making difficult
judgments about whether and, if so, how to disclose sensitive treat-
ment information to patients. As the Missouri Court of Appeals put it
in Roberson v. Menorah Medical Center,178 "[t]he presentation to the pa-
tient of risks involved in prospective surgery cannot but call for some
very nice judgments .... [T]he patient may have his apprehensions
unnecessarily and unduly heightened if risks are unwisely presented,
leading him to an imprudent choice. Risks must be placed in perspec-
175 See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). The
court found:
It is the surgeon and not the hospital who has the education, training and
experience necessary to advise each patient of risks associated with the pro-
posed surgery. Likewise, by virtue of his relationship with the patient, the
physician is in the best position to know the patient's medical history and to




178 588 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
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tive."'179 Similarly, the court in Fiorentino called these judgments "the
most delicate matter" of the physician-patient relationship,1 8 0 and
many courts have employed that language since.""
Thus, while the first claim is about technical expertise, the second
concerns the art of patient communication. Despite this distinction,
however, courts generally lump the two claims together in the course
of ruling that hospitals lack the expertise to participate in the in-
formed consent process. 1 82
While the informed consent process certainly depends on expert
knowledge about patients' conditions, their treatment options, and
the risks and benefits of those options, case law has overblown its im-
portance, failing to observe boundaries to medical expertise in in-
formed consent. This is most obvious in the case law's failure to
recognize that physicians, while expert at identifying treatment disclo-
sures, are not necessarily expert communicators.
Since the 1970s researchers have studied the quality of communi-
cation between doctor and patient, and their work has revealed that
physicians employ communication methods that undercut the likeli-
hood that patients will understand what they are told.183 For exam-
179 Id. at 137.
180 Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967).
181 See, e.g., Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 914 (N.C.
Ct. App.), affd, 362 S.E.2d 273 (N.C. 1987); Alexander v. Gonser, 711 P.2d 347, 351
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Mathias v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 330, 333
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
182 For example, consider the complete passage from Roberson:
The presentation to the patient of risks involved in prospective surgery
cannot but call for some very nice judgments. On the one hand the patient
is entitled to such information as he needs to make an intelligent decision
and to give an informed intelligent consent. And yet the patient may have
his apprehensions unnecessarily and unduly heightened if risks are unwisely
presented, leading him to an imprudent choice. Risks must be placed in
perspective. The one dealing with the patient at this point must have knowl-
edge of the patient-his temperament, his intelligence, his mental condition
and his physical condition. He must also have a knowledge of the surgery
itself-its risks, whether imminent or remote, and whether it is pressing, de-
ferrable or optional. He must know the availability of conservative methods
of treatment, if any, and their promises for success as compared to the sur-
gery. All these factors must be placed in the equation. The physician alone
is equipped to make the delicate judgments called for.
Roberson, 588 S.W.2d at 137; see also Kelly, 664 A.2d at 151 (referring to an informed
consent claim against the hospital as "not only improvident but unworkable as well"
because it turns on hospitals' exercising skills they do not possess).
183 Indeed, by the mid-1980s, most of the observations that follow concerning the
shortcomings of doctor-patient communication and their effect on the informed con-
sent process were apparent from the empirical work completed as of that date. See
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ple, physicians tend to use technical medical terms, which patients do
not understand.18 4 Additionally, even on nontechnical matters, they
commonly employ language at a graduate-school level of complexity,
which again most patients are ill-equipped to comprehend. l 5 Fur-
thermore, physician-patient communications often reinforce a power
imbalance between the two parties and thereby discourages patients
from asking questions. For example, physicians control the interac-
tions by asking close-ended questions, interrupting patient answers
and redirecting conversation.1 8 6 Likewise, physician-patient interac-
tions tend to be relatively short, serving the physician's interest in
clinical efficiency.' 8 7 Moreover, doctor-patient communication takes
place at a time when patients are feeling ill or simply anxious. In such
a communicative environment, it is unlikely that patients will remem-
ber or understand information provided to them. 188
Finally, the problem of "framing bias" in doctor-patient commu-
nication has been apparent since the early 1980s.18 9 Whether done
intentionally or unintentionally, physicians affect the treatment
choices patients make by the way they present treatment information
to patients. 190 For example, individuals are significantly more likely to
consent to a proposed surgical procedure if statistics concerning prior
FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 316-29 (summarizing data and its
implications).
184 See Robert Gatter, Unnecessary Adversaries at the End of Life: Mediating End-of-Life
Treatment Disputes To Prevent Erosion of Physician-Patient Relationships, 79 B.U. L. REV.
1091, 1114 n.105 (1999) (citing Vera M. Henzl, Linguistic Means of Social Distancing in
Physician-Patient Communication, in DOCToR-PATIENT INTERACTION 78, 86-87 (Wal-
burga Von Raffier-Engel ed., 1989)); see also FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at
316-19 (recognizing that, even when technical terms are avoided or defined, concep-
tual differences remain because of differences in background and training).
185 See BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 196-97 (citing empirical evaluations of lan-
guage used in informed consent forms); see also Gatter, supra note 184, at 1114 n.105
(same).
186 See M. Kim Marvel et al., Soliciting the Patient's Agenda: Have We Improved?, 281
JAMA 283 (1999); see also Gatter, supra note 184, at 1114 n.104 (citing NANCY AINS-
WORTH-VAUGHN, CLAIMING POWER IN DOCTOR-PATIENT TALK 68-71, 89 (1998); ALEXAN-
DRA DUNDAS TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES 82-90 (1989); CANDACE WEST, ROUTINE
COMPLICATIONS: TROUBLES WITH TALK BETWEEN DOCTORS AND PATIENTS 51-96
(1984)).
187 See David Mechanic et al., Are Patients' Office Visits with Physicians Getting Shorter?,
344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198 (2001) (finding that, on average, physicians spent twenty
minutes with each patient, which represented an increase of about two minutes as
compared to just ten years earlier); see also Fraser, supra note 7, at 267-68.
188 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 323-26 (examining the effects of
stress and illness on comprehension in the informed consent process).
189 See id. at 319 n.47, 320 n.48 (citing to studies published in 1981 and 1982).
190 See id. at 319-20.
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patients' outcomes are presented in terms of a survival rate rather
than a mortality rate. 19 1 This, in turn, creates an opportunity for a
physician's bias about a medical treatment decision to interfere with
the patient's understanding of her treatment options and with her
ability to make an autonomous choice.
Thus, empirical evidence has demonstrated for more than twenty
years that physicians are not experts at communicating treatment in-
formation to their patients in ways that promote understanding. This
may explain why a recent review of empirical studies concluded that
using a third-party educator may be the best method for improving
comprehension of information provided during the informed consent
process.1 92 Nonetheless, the law continues to impose duties of disclo-
sure only on physicians on the theory that they are best equipped to
explain treatment risks to patients. 193
Not only has the law's policy against imposing informed consent
duties on hospitals endured despite evidence undercutting its assump-
tion that physicians are expert communicators, it has also survived the
realization that informed consent disclosures can be standardized and
thus does not depend on an in-person deployment of technical, medi-
cal expertise. Case law presumes that a physician is needed to custom
tailor treatment disclosures to each patient based upon the physician's
expert assessment of the patient's unique informational needs. In
early cases, courts claimed that physicians needed to determine what
treatment information to withhold from their patients based on the
physician's clinical evaluation of the patient's emotional and physical
condition. I 94 For example, the Fiorentino court, in support of its find-
ing that only physicians are qualified to disclose treatment informa-
tion, reasoned that a physician's expertise is needed to assess
"fluctuating indications" of a patient's ability to cope with such infor-
191 See Katrina Armstrong et al., Effects of Framing as Gain Versus Loss in Understand-
ing and Hypothetical Treatment Choices: Survival and Mortality Curves, 22 MED. DECISION
MAMKNG 76 (2002). Interestingly, Faden and Beauchamp describe a nearly identical
study published in 1982, which reached the same conclusion. See FADEN &
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 319-20 (citing Barbara McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of
Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982)).
192 SeeJames Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions To Improve Research Participants'
Understanding in Informed Consent for Research: A Systematic Review, 292 JAMA 1593
(2004) (reviewing results of many empirical studies testing various methods for im-
proving comprehension of information provided to potential research subjects as part
of the process of informed consent for participation in clinical research).
193 See, e.g., Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
194 SeeRoberson v. Menorah Med. Ctr., 588 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)
(claiming that physicians must determine whether to withhold information based on
the physician's assessment of the patient's physical condition and "temperment").
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mation. 19 5 Additionally, the court found not only that each patient
requires a separate assessment, but also that any one patient's ability
to cope with treatment information can change and thus must be reas-
sessed from time to time. 196 More recent cases, on the other hand,
imagine that physicians add detail to their disclosures based upon the
particular medical circumstances of each patient. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Kelly v. Methodist Hospital,197 for example, found
that physicians individualize their disclosures "in light of the [pa-
tient's] particular medical history," and it contrasts this with the per-
ception that hospitals would make disclosures "in laundry-list
fashion." 98 Given the presumption that the content of a treatment
disclosure turns in part on a physician's expert assessment of each
patient's fluctuating medical and emotional conditions, courts per-
ceive the disclosure process should not be subject to institutional
standardization because it is too "dynamic" and "individualized."'199
This perception, however, has been proven wrong. Certainly, a
physician's expertise is often required to address a patient's particular
concerns or unique informational needs. Yet, the need for expert,
custom-tailored disclosures is not so great as to make standardized dis-
closures impossible or imprudent. Indeed, the case law's implied
claim that standardization is bad public policy ignores the fact that
principles of fairness and efficiency temper goals of protecting pa-
tients and their autonomy through the informed consent doctrine. At
its inception and throughout its early development, the informed con-
sent doctrine was almost purely patient-centered, with public policy
debates focused on how best to balance the protection of patients'
well-being with protection of patients' autonomy.200 During the
1970s, informed consent became defined by the goal of promoting
patient autonomy. 201 Shortly thereafter, critical commentary focused
on an apparent gap that was witnessed between the informed consent
doctrine as conceived and the informed consent doctrine as it was
employed in the law and in medical practice, culminating in the mid-
1980s with the publication of The Silent World of Doctor and Patient by
195 See Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967).
196 See id.
197 664 A.2d 148.
198 Id. at 151.
199 See Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Pa. 2002) ("In-
formed consent flows from the discussions each patient has with his physician, based
on the facts and circumstances each case presents. We decline to interject an element
of a hospital's control into this highly individualized and dynamic relationship.").
200 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8, at 25-40.
201 See id. at 40-42.
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Jay Katz20 2 and A History and Theory of Informed Consent by Ruth R.
Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp. 20 3 As the doctrine matured, however,
other public policy concerns received their due. For example, the law
recognized that, out of fairness, physicians should not be burdened
with the responsibility of meeting every informational need of each
individual patient and assuring that each patient actually understood
the treatment information provided to her. Instead, physicians were
responsible for disclosing only material information, with patients
bearing the burden to both pursue any additional information and to
make sense of the information that was provided. 20 4 Furthermore,
commentators recognized the costs associated with an uncompromis-
ing commitment to patient autonomy, and calls to eliminate the gap
between rhetoric and reality of informed consent are now qualified by
concerns for promoting clinically efficient medical decisionmaking.
20 5
Thus, the law's policy against imposing informed consent duties
on hospitals on the grounds that public policy demands such a high
degree of expert individualization of patient disclosures as to elimi-
nate standardized disclosure is directly at odds with current state of
public policy about informed consent. Somehow, evolving thought
about the goals and limits of the informed consent doctrine has by-
passed this segment of informed consent law.
Beyond its claim that standardized disclosures are a bad idea, the
law also erroneously claims that such standardization is in fact impossi-
ble.2 0 6 Reality, however, disproves this claim as well. Certainly, the
availability of new, online informed consent applications that disclose
standard treatment options and their risks and benefits based on pa-
202 See KATz, supra note 8.
203 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 8.
204 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
205 Peter H. Schuck's article, Rethinking Informed Consent, was highly influential. It
persuasively identified and criticized how informed consent commentary had stag-
nated because commentators speak exclusively from the perspective of either a propo-
nent of patient autonomy or a proponent of clinical efficiency. Schuck, supra note 27,
at 902-05. I borrowed Schuck's theme in my own writing on informed consent, argu-
ing that we cannot ignore the "trade-off between the benefit of greater autonomy and
the clinical costs of achieving it" and concluding that, "Ujust as it makes no sense to
achieve greater clinical efficiency through eliminating the rights of patients to con-
sent to treatments, it makes no sense to achieve fully autonomous medical decision-
making by bankrupting the health care delivery system." Gatter, supra note 8, at 588.
206 See, e.g., Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
("[W]e are unable to conceive of how a hospital could draft, in laundry-list fashion,
'the substantive information to be disclosed' for each surgery as it relates to each
patient. Thus, the approach suggested by appellants would prove not only improvi-
dent but unworkable as well." (quoting Shaw v. Kirschbaum, 653 A.2d 12, 15 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1994)).
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tients' medical conditions is evidence that standardization is possi-
ble.2 0 7 Yet, standardized informed consent disclosures have a longer
history, and, ironically, the law is instrumental in that history. First,
federal regulations adopted in the early 1970s obligated research insti-
tutions, including hospitals, to form institutional review boards and
assure that they oversee all aspects of human subjects research going
on in their facilities, including, in particular, the substantive disclo-
sures that prospective research subjects were to receive as part of the
informed consent process. 20 8 Thus, for more than thirty years IRBs
have scrutinized consent forms that list specific risks and benefits of
participation in proposed medical experiments, which, if approved,
are distributed to prospective research subjects in a uniform manner.
While such standardized disclosures are not the exclusive source of
information for prospective research subjects about the risks of partic-
ipation in a clinical study, they are an essential component of assuring
that disclosures are adequate and uniformly delivered. Second, states
routinely supplement general informed consent standards by mandat-
ing the disclosure of particular risk information associated with spe-
cific procedures. 20 9 In fact, laws in at least two states attempt to codify
treatment-specific, standardized, informed consent disclosures for
every known procedure. The legislatures in Texas and Louisiana have
established medical disclosure panels and charged them with the re-
sponsibility of identifying all medical procedures for which risk disclo-
sures are necessary and, for each of those procedures, creating a
standard set of disclosures. 2 10 These procedure-specific, disclosure
lists are then publicized, and a physician is presumed to have satisfied
her obligation to provide adequate disclosures to a patient concerning
a proposed procedure if she delivers to the patient the relevant stan-
207 See supra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-95-108(a) (3) (Supp. 2005) (requiring that physi-
cians disclose "vitamin deficiency and malnutrition" as a risk of gastric bypass sur-
gery); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1645 (West 1990 & Supp. 2006) (requiring
physicians to disclose to surgical patients their options of receiving transfusions of
autologous blood or directed or nondirected homologous blood from volunteers to-
gether with the risks and benefits of each blood source, and to do so "by means of a
standardized written summary" developed by the state's health department); id.
§ 1690 (West 1990) (requiring physicians to disclose to all patients for whom a hyster-
ectomy has been proposed that the procedure will render the patient sterile and that
the procedure is irreversible).
210 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40E (2001 & Supp. 2005); TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.102-103 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
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dardized list of disclosures. 211 Finally, despite its stated goal of provid-
ing patients with treatment information that is necessary for patients
in their specific circumstances to make informed treatment choices,
the law generally permits physicians to formulate disclosures based on
their patients' medical conditions or proposed treatments without re-
gard to other attributes that might make that patient unique.2 12 As I
have described elsewhere, state laws obligate physicians to disclose
"material" treatment information, but they permit physicians to iden-
tify "material" information based solely on either the patient's diagno-
sis or the treatment that has been proposed to the patient.2 1 3
Accordingly, physicians may ignore all nonmedical attributes of their
patients in formulating their disclosures without fear of liability. In
this way, the common law too permits standardized disclosures based
on medical conditions and treatments.
Although there is room for debate about how best to combine
standardized and individualized disclosure in informed consent, there
can be no doubt that standardization is possible and that it should
play a role in informed consent processes designed to both adequately
and efficiently enable patients to make informed treatment choices.
Furthermore, standardization in informed consent changes the way
physician expertise is deployed in the informed consent process. It is
used to develop standard disclosures and to identify the clinical cir-
cumstances in which those disclosures may be used. Consequently,
there is less need to have a physician on hand in every clinical encoun-
ter where disclosures will be made.
To this point, we have examined how the legitimate role for med-
ical expertise in the informed consent process has been diminished by
the realization that physicians, despite their expert knowledge about
treatments and their risks, are not necessarily expert communicators
of treatment information, and how it has been further diminished by
a concern for clinical efficiency in informed consent and, with it,
greater legitimacy for standardization practices in the disclosure of
treatment information. The role for medical expertise has been di-
minished further still by the law's well-documented shift away from
identifying treatment information that must be disclosed based on a
professional standard of care.214 The law first recognized a duty of
211 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40E; TEX. Cry. PrAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 74.105.
212 See generally Gatter, supra note 8, at 567-74.
213 See id. at 567-68.
214 For histories of informed consent law, see BERG ET AL., supra note 8, at 41-52;
FADEN & BEAUCHAMp, supra note 8, at 114-50; KATz, supra note 8, at 1-29.
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disclosure associated with a duty to obtain consent in the late 1950s,2 15
and shortly thereafter it was established that a claimed breach of the
duty of disclosure would be treated as a professional negligence
claim.216 Consequently, the scope of the duty to disclose is based on a
medical standard of care: a physician must disclose to patients infor-
mation about a proposed treatment as would a reasonably prudent
physician under the same or similar circumstances. 217 Thus, the pro-
fessional standard for disclosure applied in informed consent cases
generally in 1967 when Fiorentino refused to recognize an informed
consent duty applicable to a hospital, reasoning that the law should
not impose such a duty except on those with medical expertise. 218
The standard by which the law defines the duty to disclose began to
change, however, in 1972 with the decision in Canterbury v. Spence,219
which employed a reasonable-person, rather than a reasonable-physi-
cian, standard of disclosure. 220 It held that a physician must disclose
to a patient treatment information that a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position,
would consider material to her treatment decision. 221 Although the
reasonable-person standard has not completely replaced the reasona-
ble-physician standard, it has been adopted by approximately half of
all U.S. jurisdictions. 222 That standard rejects the claim that the classi-
fication of treatment information as either material or immaterial is a
matter of medical expertise. Thus, it further diminishes the role for
physician expertise in the disclosure process. Rather than directing
physicians to make disclosures based on the customs of their medical
colleagues, the reasonable-person standard instructs physicians to be
guided by what reasonable lay persons would want to know. Accord-
ingly, medical expertise may be used legitimately to identify a patient's
condition, the viable options for treating that condition, the risks and
benefits of each of those options, and the various probabilities that
those risks and benefits arise. The next step, however, of determining
215 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957).
216 See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan.), clarified by 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960); see also FADEN & BEAucHAMp, supra note 8, at 132 (arguing that courts address-
ing claims of inadequate disclosure after Natanson generally adopted the professional
negligence model).
217 See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106.
218 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
219 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
220 See id. at 787.
221 See id.
222 See Gatter, supra note 8, at 563-67; see also FuRROW ET AL., supra note 97, at
356-66.
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which of these expertly assembled pieces of information will be dis-
closed to the patient is not a matter of expertise according to the rea-
sonable-person standard.
The vast majority of cases addressing whether hospitals can be
held liable for breaches of the informed consent doctrine were de-
cided after 1972,223 and thus after the reasonable-person standard for
disclosure had been introduced as a minority viewpoint. Conse-
quently, some were decided in jurisdictions employing the reasonable-
person standard while others were decided in jurisdictions using the
reasonable-physician standard. Yet, there does not appear to be a cor-
relation between the standard of disclosure used in a particular juris-
diction and the outcome of case alleging that a hospital has breached
an informed consent duty. In other words, despite a shift in policy
over the last thirty years away from complete deference to medical
expertise about what treatment information is and is not relevant to
treatment decisions, the law's policy against imposing informed con-
sent duties on hospitals has remained constant as has its underlying
rationale that only physicians have the expertise necessary to justify
the law's recognition of informed consent duties.
A common theme has emerged from the analysis to this point.
The law's policy against imposing informed consent duties on hospi-
tals is a survivor. It has persisted in spite of substantial shifts in in-
formed consent policy and practice, even when some of those shifts
have occurred within the law itself. This theme continues as a shift in
the law's perception of hospitals and their legal responsibility for safe-
guarding their patients is examined.
C. The Policy's Persistence Despite the Rise of Corporate Negligence in
Health Care
The law's policy against imposing informed consent duties on
hospitals has also survived the rise of direct institutional liability in
health care, and this is perhaps the best evidence of the policy's stay-
ing power. The corporate negligence doctrine, which imposes a gen-
eral duty on hospitals to safeguard their patients, appears on its face
to apply to the issue of institutional informed consent. As described
in detail below, this is evidenced by the fact that several courts consid-
ering claims of institutional informed consent liability have expressly
addressed the doctrine in their rulings. Nonetheless, they have re-
fused to recognize institutional informed consent duties arising from
the doctrine. Thus, as demonstrated below, the law appears to have
223 See supra notes 1, 67 (listing cases holding that hospitals have informed consent
duties).
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made a deliberate policy choice to shield the informed consent pro-
cess from institutional liability principles that apply to all other aspects
of the hospital-patient relationship.
The corporate negligence doctrine was first recognized in the
mid-1960s, 224 and it both took shape and took hold during the 1980s
and early 1990s. 225 It recognizes that a hospital owes each of its pa-
tients a duty "to ensure the patient's safety and well-being while at the
hospital," 226 and it includes a duty to maintain safe and adequate facil-
ities, to permit only qualified physicians to practice within the institu-
tion, to oversee those who practice within the hospital, and to
implement policies and procedures designed to ensure quality care
for hospital patients. 2 2 7 The doctrine was a substantial change from
earlier law because it recognized that hospitals owe duties directly to
their patients. Thus, patients were no longer obligated to rely solely
on a claim of vicarious liability to receive compensation for a treat-
ment injury from a hospital.228
On its face, the doctrine supports imposing informed consent du-
ties on hospitals. As a general matter, a patient's safety is undermined
when she is at risk for receiving unauthorized treatments or for suffer-
ing a treatment's side effects about which she was unaware at the time
of treatment. In other words, a failure to obtain informed consent is
not only a matter of personal indignity, it is also a matter of dimin-
ished safety and poor quality care.2 29 Furthermore, two of the particu-
224 See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ill.
1965) (holding sufficient evidence existed to support a factual determination that a
hospital owed and breached a duty to implement a system for identifying and re-
sponding to inadequate treatment of a patient by a physician permitted to practice
within the hospital).
225 See, e.g., Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing a
hospital's duty to its patients to monitor and oversee treatment provided by physicians
permitted to practice within the institution); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d
703, 707 (Pa. 1991) (hospital owes each patient a duty "to ensure the patient's safety
and well-being while at the hospital"); see also Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler,
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HLARv.
L. REV. 381, 385-94 (1994) (tracing the evolution of the corporate negligence doc-
trine following the fall of charitable immunity for hospitals and a period of reliance
on agency liability, and reporting that, as of 1994, twenty-one states had adopted the
corporate negligence doctrine).
226 Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 706-07 (summarizing the history of hospital liability from charitable
immunity to vicarious liability and then to corporate negligence).
229 While the informed consent doctrine is traditionally known for its vindication
of the right to self-determination among patients, see, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron,
Informed Consent in Catatrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 340,
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lar duties recognized under the direct institutional liability principle
encompass a role for hospitals in assuring that patients have provided
informed consent prior to treatment.23 0 The doctrine imposes a duty
for hospitals to "oversee all persons who practice medicine within its
walls as to patient care," 23 1 which would include physicians when they
use their professional skills to identify and communicate medical con-
ditions, treatment options, and the risks and benefits of those options
for their patients while in the hospital. Additionally, there is "a duty
to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure
quality care for the patients," 23 2 which would include the obligation of
hospitals to implement policies and procedures designed to assure
that patients are not being exposed to treatment risks they did not
knowledgeably assume or to treatments they did not authorize.
The applicability of direct institutional liability principles to the
issue of hospital liability for informed consent failures goes deeper
than the language of the liability rules, however. It originates in the
policy underlying those principles.
Ultimately, it is the need for hospitals to coordinate complex
medical care that justifies the law's imposing on hospitals a duty to
safeguard patients. In the second half of the twentieth century, hospi-
tals evolved from being merely the places where complex care took
place to being the systems that managed that complexity. 233 Modern
hospitals maintain various kinds of facilities and services designed to
347 (1974), it has been adopted as a doctrine that promotes patient safety and health
care quality as well, see THE LEAPFRoG GROUP, HOSPITAL QUALITY AND SAFETY SURVEY
46 (2005), https://leapfrog.medstat.com/pdf/final.pdf (describing informed con-
sent as "an additional layer of protection [that] decrease [s] the potential for medical
errors"); see also INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
196 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (identifying the informed patient as a "major
unused resource in most hospitals, clinics, and practices" who-armed with an in-
formed understanding of his medications-can "intercept the rare but predictable
error" related to medications); JoINT COMM'N, supra note 129, 5.2-5.3 (making the
implementation of informed consent policies and procedures a requirement of hospi-
tal accreditation).
230 See, e.g., Tuttle v. Silver, 21 Pa. D. & C.4th 271 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1993) (holding
that the corporate negligence duties to oversee those who practice within a hospital
and to implement policies and procedures to ensure quality of care provide a founda-
tion for imposing informed consent duties on hospitals), abrogated by Kelly v. Method-
ist Hosp., 664 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
231 Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.
232 Id.
233 Rosemary Stevens, in her history of twentieth-century U.S. hospitals, traces this
change to the 1930s when medical care became more technological and thus more
hospital-based. Because of the growth in technological complexity of care, the hospi-
tal took on an independent institutional life, changing from the individual physician's
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centralize the care of acutely ill patients, including operating rooms,
intensive care units, radiological services, laboratory services, and
pharmacies. Likewise, they bring together highly skilled personnel at
all levels of expertise (e.g., physicians, nurses, and technicians) across
a variety of generalized, specialized, and sub-specialized fields of
medicine. Most importantly, hospitals implement systems to coordi-
nate personnel and resources for the purposes of providing complete
and high quality medical care to each of their patients. As one court
put it, "[t]he corporate hospital of today has assumed the role of a
comprehensive health center with responsibility for arranging and co-
ordinating the total health care of its patients."234
By imposing direct institutional duties on hospitals to safeguard
their patients, the law acknowledges that the quality of medical care in
hospitals is significantly affected by the degree of institutional over-
sight and coordination employed at hospitals, and that the task of
oversight and coordination is best placed on hospitals as managers.
As Professors Abraham and Weiler describe it, medical care is increas-
ingly provided through "teams" of personnel, which increases the risk
of a bad medical outcome as a result of "failures of communication"
among team members, and the law must account for this by imposing
liability on those best situated to organize and equip those teams.235
"[T] he hospital," they conclude, "occupies an ideal strategic position
within the health care system from which to accomplish this crucial
quality assurance mission." 23 6
Thus, the value that hospitals bring to the process of informed
consent is their ability to improve quality through systemic organiza-
tion. Hospitals can improve the process by contributing capital,
human resources, and institutional procedures for the purposes of (1)
identifying standard disclosures; (2) assuring that disclosures are accu-
rate, thorough, understandable, and continuously available to patients
for repeat learning; (3) recording and confirming informed consent;
(4) providing greater access to personnel for assistance throughout
the decisionmaking process; and (5) continuously identifying and cor-
"workshop" to "a technological system in its own right." ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SICK-
NESS AND IN WEALTH 172-81 (rev. ed., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999) (1979).
234 Thompson, 591 A.2d at 706.
235 See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 225, at 413 (arguing for the law to move
from the current system of permitting claims of individual physician malpractice and
claims of corporate negligence against hospitals to a system of comprehensive enter-
prise liability).
236 Id.; see also INST. OF MED., supra note 229, at 69-201 (concluding that medical
errors are most commonly a result of system failures and that improving safety begins
with improving the way health care systems are organized and overseen).
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recting deficiencies in institutional informed consent practices. All of
this decreases the risk that treatments are provided without informed
consent.
Hospital coordination of informed consent is also likely to im-
prove the efficiency of health care delivery in two ways. First, by assur-
ing that patients receive accurate, thorough, understandable, and
repeatedly accessible treatment information, hospitals increase the
likelihood that patients select a treatment option that serves their
treatment goals and minimizes their personal risk of harm. 23 7 Sec-
ond, hospitals can assure that informed consent tasks are delegated
across a spectrum of institutional mechanisms and personnel in a
manner that provides sufficient expertise at all stages of the process
without unnecessarily burdening personnel at any level of expertise.
This would relieve physicians of the responsibility of orchestrating in-
formed consent, and it would assure that the clinical time physicians
spend on informed consent is driven by a real need for their exper-
tise. Such efficiencies may improve health care quality as well because
well informed patients tend to comply more completely with treat-
ment plans and experience better treatment outcomes than other pa-
tients, 238 and because relief from overburdened clinical time likely
decreases the risk of medical error.
Given the clear alignment of institutional liability principles, pol-
icy favoring improved systemic management of complex health care,
and the value hospitals can add by managing the informed consent
process, one would assume that courts could not avoid imposing in-
formed consent duties on hospitals when confronted with these argu-
ments. But this is not the case. The vast majority of courts addressing
whether the corporate negligence doctrine provides a basis for impos-
ing informed consent duties on hospitals have held that it does not.23 9
Meanwhile, almost every case ruling that informed consent duties ap-
237 See Gatter, supra note 8, at 590-91 (describing an increased likelihood of pa-
tients receiving optimal treatments-i.e., treatments that are likely to satisfy their
goals, as an efficient result).
238 See id. at 591 & n.177; see also Laura A. Siminoff et al., The Promise of Empirical
Research in the Study of Informed Consent Theory and Practice, 16 HEALTHCARE ETHICS
COMMITTEE F. 53, 56 (2004).
239 See, e.g., Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Johnson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d 797 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Cooper v. Curry, 589 P.2d 201
(N.M. Ct. App. 1978); Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.E.2d 392 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981); Tucker v.
Cmty. Med. Ctr., 833 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Kelly v. Methodist Hosp., 664
A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Howell v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 785
P.2d 815 (Wash. 1990). But see Magana v. Elie, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
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ply to hospitals based on the doctrine has been overturned or other-
wise stripped of its precedential value.240
Furthermore, the facial applicability of direct institutional liability
principles appears to have had little effect on the law's thinking. The
reasoning courts employ to reject informed consent duties for hospi-
tals in the face of the corporate negligence doctrine is the same as
that used prior to the rise of that doctrine, namely that informed con-
sent requires expertise and professionalism that only physicians pos-
sess and that imposing informed consent duties on hospitals would
disrupt the doctor-patient relationship at one of its most delicate mo-
ments. 24 1 Other courts have held that the doctrine does not apply
because none of the specific duties commonly associated with the doc-
trine (e.g., the duty to select and retain only qualified physicians) ad-
dress informed consent.242 Thus, they avoid the doctrine altogether
by ignoring the broad principle of safeguarding hospital patients that
gave rise to the more specific duties on which those courts focus their
attention.
The fact that courts have considered and rejected the application
of the corporate negligence doctrine in institutional informed con-
sent claims demonstrates that the persistence of the law's policy
against imposing informed consent duties on hospitals is deliberate.
Before they were forced to address the doctrine, courts generally had
not had to account for the broad legal and clinical trends identified
above. At most, courts were faced with only sporadic arguments con-
cerning a hospital informed consent form or policy or a nurse record-
ing consent.2 43 Moreover, they had not (and still have not) faced a
case in which the defendant-hospital exercised the kind of managerial
control over the informed consent process that is becoming the norm.
Without more, one might speculate that the policy's survival has sim-
ply been an accident of history. But the law's determination that the
corporate negligence doctrine does not encompass informed consent
undercuts that interpretation and, instead, indicates that the law in-
240 See Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App.),
affd, 362 S.E.2d 273, 276 (N.C. 1987); see also Tuttle v. Silver, 21 Pa. D. & C.4th 271
(Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1993), abrogated by Kelly, 664 A.2d 148; Campana v. Robert Packer
Hosp., 12 Pa. D. & C. 4th 343 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1991), abrogated by Kelly, 664 A.2d 148.
But see Magana, 439 N.E.2d 1319.
241 See Sears, Roebuck & Co., 832 P.2d at 798-800; Campbell, 352 S.E.2d at 912-14
(Orr, J., dissenting in part); Kelly, 664 A.2d at 149-51.
242 See, e.g., Cox, 283 S.E.2d at 394-95.
243 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (concerning courts efforts to
account for hospitals' informed consent policies, procedures, and forms); supra notes
143-148 and accompanying text (describing the courts' efforts to account for hospi-
tals' use of nurses in the informed consent process).
1256 [VOL. 8 1:4
INFORMED CONSENT LIABILITY FOR HOSPITALS
tends to preserve its policy against imposing informed consent duties
on hospitals.
All of this, in turn, suggests that the policy against imposing in-
formed consent duties on hospitals will survive new and future trends
as well. Consider, for example, the current trend to improve health
care quality. Following a 2000 report on medical error by the Institute
of Medicine, 244 public attention has turned to improving health care
quality by improving the organizational systems in which health care is
delivered. Nonetheless, since 2001 eight courts in seven different
states have ruled against imposing informed consent duties against
hospitals. 245 This includes two cases in Pennsylvania decided after a
legislative overhaul of that state's medical liability system, 246 which in-
cluded new requirements for hospitals to implement quality improve-
ment programs specifically designed to identify and correct failures of
institutional systems that result in harm to patients and a new state
authority designed to enforce those requirements. 247
Thus, the survival of the law's policy does not appear to be an-
other example of law unintentionally lagging behind social or techno-
logical advances. Accordingly, one cannot assume that a change in
the policy is simply a matter of time. 248 Instead, proponents of
change must account for the law's deliberate choice to exempt hospi-
tals from liability related to informed consent when hospitals are held
generally responsible for safeguarding their patients. This is the task
taken on below in Part III. First, however, new institutional informed
consent duties are proposed.
D. Proposed Institutional Informed Consent Duties
The false logic on which the law's policy rests and the clinical and
legal trends that the policy has survived not only indicate a need for
reform, they also suggest the nature of that reform. As described be-
244 See INST. OF MED., supra note 229.
245 See Foster v. Traul, 120 P.3d 278 (Idaho 2005); Mohsan v Roule-Graham, 907
So. 2d 804 (La. Ct. App. 2005); DeSena ex ret. DeSena v. NYU Med. Ctr., 773 N.Y.S.2d
836 (App. Div. 2003); Daniels v. Durham County Hosp. Corp., 615 S.E.2d 60 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2005); Long v. Jaszczak, 688 N.W.2d 173 (N.D. 2004); Valles v. Albert Einstein
Med. Ctr., 805 A.2d 1232 (Pa. 2002); Tucker v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., 833 A.2d 217 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2003); Newell v. Trident Med. Ctr., 597 S.E.2d 776 (S.C. 2004).
246 See Valles, 805 A.2d 1232; Tucker, 833 A.2d 217.
247 See Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (MCARE), 2002 Pa.
Laws 154 (codified at 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1303.101-.910 (Supp. 2005)). For
the provisions relating to hospital quality improvement programs, see 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1303.301-314 (Supp. 2005).
248 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6.
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low, the law should enforce against hospitals a series of duties, re-
ferred to collectively as institutional informed consent duties.
The duties are not designed to remove physicians from the in-
formed consent process, but rather to redistribute informed consent
responsibilities that the law has traditionally allocated to physicians
alone. Moreover, the redistribution reflected in the institutional in-
formed consent duties proposed here is based on the premise that the
physician is expert at the initial task of identifying a patient's medical
condition, the viable treatment options for that condition, and the
risks and benefits of each of those options. Likewise, it is premised on
the fact that physicians, despite their medical expertise, are not expert
at communicating treatment information and that their clinical time
may not be best spent engaged in the depth and breadth of communi-
cation necessary to facilitate comprehension. Accordingly, the duties
are designed to shift to hospitals informed consent responsibilities
that do not depend upon medical expertise, and, in this way, they are
intended to complement the legitimate use of medical expertise in
informed consent.
First, a duty should be imposed on hospitals to require that physi-
cians on staff obtain the informed consent of their patients prior to
any treatments provided at the hospital, and that each hospital imple-
ments procedures to ensure that its physicians abide by this require-
ment. For example, hospitals should keep track of instances in which
it appears that treatment was provided without consent or without ad-
equately informed consent, and this information must be made part
of quality review and credentialing functions of hospitals. Such a sys-
tem would enable hospitals to identify and take corrective action with
respect to physicians whose informed consent practices appear to re-
peatedly fall below the standard of care.
Second, the law should recognize a duty for hospitals to assure
that no treatment is provided in the hospital without prior verification
that the patient has provided an informed consent to the proposed
treatment. At a minimum, this would require hospitals to assure that
consent to a proposed procedure is recorded in a manner that can be
reviewed, that such record of consent is verified immediately prior to
treatment, and that treatments will not proceed unless a record of the
patient's consent can be verified. In addition, the duty should be in-
terpreted to require hospitals to verify that certain categories of infor-
mation were provided to the patient, including the patient's medical
condition, the viable options for treating that condition, and the risks
and benefits of each treatment option. This would likely mean that
hospitals would be forced to require physicians to make a written re-
cord of the disclosures that were made to each patient. Furthermore,
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to the extent that treatment disclosures are standardized or otherwise
established, then the hospital should be required to assure that at
least the standard disclosures were made. This duty should not be
interpreted, however, to require hospitals to assure that all disclosures
required by law were made because there will be cases in which no
standard set of disclosures exists and in which additional disclosures
beyond those contained in a standard disclosure may be required be-
cause of peculiar medical circumstances of the patient.
Third, the law should impose on hospitals a duty to include in
their quality assurance programs the monitoring of informed consent
practices and outcomes. Such a duty would improve the likelihood
that hospitals identify and correct systemic flaws in their informed
consent programs.
Fourth, where hospitals disseminate treatment information di-
rectly to patients, they have a duty to assure that the information is
accurate, complete, understandable, and equally accessible to all simi-
larly situated hospital patients. This duty includes a duty to maintain
equipment used in the informed consent process in reasonable work-
ing order. The duty assures that hospitals are directly responsible to
patients for flaws in any information disclosure system implemented
by a hospital, and it applies whether the hospital designed the system
itself or acquired it from an outside vendor.
Finally, where hospitals employ personnel to assist patients in the
decisionmaking process, they should have a duty to assure that those
individuals are qualified to provide medical decisionmaking assistance
and that those employees are scheduled by the hospitals such that
there is reasonable access to such help regardless of the time of day.
Each of these duties is derived from actual clinical practice by
hospitals with respect to informed consent, and each is designed to
protect the patient's interest in receiving only those treatments the
patient has authorized in a knowledgeable way. Moreover, they each
have a foundation in the corporate negligence doctrine because they
are designed to safeguard patients and improve the quality of care.
Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that the law will impose
institutional informed consent duties outlined here despite their solid
foundation in clinical practice and law. Instead, nearly forty years of
experience indicates that the law's policy against imposing informed
consent duties on hospitals is unlikely to be reversed notwithstanding
clear evidence of hospital involvement in the informed consent pro-
cess or well established institutional liability principles. Thus, unless
the mysterious survival of this policy can be accounted for, the law
appears unlikely to adopt any proposed set of institutional informed
consent duties.
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III. Do ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT TRUST AND INFORMED CONSENT
RESOLVE THE MYSTERY?
The question remains: how has the law's policy against imposing
informed consent duties on hospitals survived? It is argued here that
unarticulated and erroneous assumptions by the law about trust in
medicine and its relationship to informed consent may be the answer
to this question. Perhaps the policy rests on the idea that the law must
not undermine trust in physicians and that protecting the informed
consent process as a function purely of the doctor-patient relationship
is key in that effort. As described below, such a view would be consis-
tent with claims about the importance of trust in medicine and de-
scriptions of informed consent as a fiduciary doctrine. Additionally, it
would account for not only the policy's survival, but also the reasons
courts give for refusing to impose informed consent duties on hospi-
tals. Moreover, it would identify a strategy for reform. Our growing
knowledge of trust in medicine indicates that trust operates across the
many players in modern health care delivery, including physicians,
hospitals, and health insurers, and that it is implicated in all aspects of
health care delivery. Accordingly, as concluded below, the fundamen-
tal problem with the law's policy against imposing informed consent
duties on hospitals is that it has an inappropriately narrow view of
trust in medicine, one that fails to account for the role of hospitals
and the informed consent process in creating a trustworthy system for
care. This, in turn, bolsters the proposal to adopt the institutional
duties described above because they redistribute informed consent re-
sponsibilities in a manner that promotes trust in the systems through
which patients receive care.
A. Making the Case for an Unarticulated Goal of Preserving
Medical Trust
Trust is characterized by the vulnerability of one to the discre-
tionary care of another; trust occurs when one believes that someone
to whom she has consigned her interests will protect and serve those
interests. 249 Trust in medicine, then, results when a patient, already
249 See Robert Gatter, Walking the Talk of Trust in Human Subjects Research: The Chal-
lenge of Regulating Financial Conflicts of Interest, 52 EMORY L.J. 327, 358 (2003); Mark A.
Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 474 (2002) [hereinafter Hall,
Law, Medicine, and Trust] (describing trust as having "an optimistic attitude towards
one's vulnerability" while in the care of another).
For additional literature relating to trust in modem medicine, see Bradford H.
Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997,
at 37; Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1131 (2001) [herein-
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vulnerable as a result of an illness or injury, chooses to make herself
more vulnerable by placing her health interests in the hands of health
professionals and health care institutions in the belief that they will
help her achieve improved health.
Trust has long been recognized as playing an integral role in
medicine, but a renewed interest in medical trust has deepened our
understanding of it.250 Most important to the inquiry here is that
trust in medicine includes different objects of trust. In other words,
trust in medicine is not merely a function of trust in physicians. In-
stead, there are several objects of trust in medicine, including hospi-
tals. 25 1 Additionally, there are different kinds of trust: interpersonal
trust, which generally is based on personal experience, and systemic
trust, which is based on perceptions of institutions and structures de-
signed to support those institutions.252 Thus, a patient could trust her
after Hall, Arrow]; Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra, David Mechanic, Changing
Medical Organization and the Erosion of Trust, 74 MILBANK Q. 171 (1996) [hereinafter
Mechanic, Changing Medical Organization]; David Mechanic, The Functions and Limita-
tions of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 661 (1998)
[hereinafter Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical
Care]; David Mechanic & Mark Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients'
Trust in Medical Care and Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693 (1996); David Mechanic,
Public Trust and Initiatives for New Health Care Partnerships, 76 MILBANK Q. 281 (1998);
Stephen D. Pearson & Lisa H. Raeke, Patients Trust in Physicians: Many Theories, Few
Measures, and Little Data, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 509 (2000).
For empirical studies relating to trust in medicine, see Lynda A. Anderson &
Robert F. Dedrick, Development of the Trust in Physician Scale: A Measure To Assess Inter-
personal Trust in Patient-Physician Relationships, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 1091 (1990); Mark A.
Hall et al., Measuring Patients' Trust in Their Primary Care Providers, 59 MED. CARE REs. &
REv. 293 (2002); Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in the Medical Profession: Conceptual and
Measurement Issues, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1419 (2002) [hereinafter Hall et al., Trust in
the Medical Profession]; Audiey C. Kao et al., Patients' Trust in Their Physicians: Effects of
Choice, Continuity, and Payment Method, 13J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 681 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Kao et al., Patients' Trust]; Audiey C. Kao et al., The Relationship Between Method of
Physician Payment and Patient Trust, 280 JAMA 1708 (1998); David H. Thorn et al.,
Further Validation and Reliability Testing of the Trust in Physician Scale, 37 MED. CARE 510
(1999); Beiyao Zheng et al., Development of a Scale To Measure Patients' Trust in Health
Insurers, 37 HEALTH SERV. RES. 187 (2002).
250 See Gatter, supra note 140, at 398-405 (identifying and explaining an emerging
medical trust movement and conclusions that have resulted from empirical study of
trust in medicine).
251 See Mark A. Hall et al., Trust in Physicians and Medical Institutions: What Is It, Can
It Be Measured, and Does It Matter?, 79 MILBANK Q. 613, 619-20 (2001); Thomas A.
LaVeist et al., Attitudes About Racism, Medical Mistrust, and Satisfaction with Care Among
African American and White Cardiac Patients, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 146 (2000).
252 See Hall et al., supra note 251, at 619-20. The interpersonal/systemic trust
distinction commonly overlaps with distinctions among the objects of trust, with inter-
personal trust directed at particular hospitals or physicians and systemic trust directed
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local hospital because of a personal experience (interpersonal trust)
or because of what she has learned about the operating structure of
that hospital (systemic trust) or because she trusts all hospitals that
share certain characteristics such as accreditation or integration into a
chain of hospitals (systemic trust again).
Furthermore, there is a halo effect associated with medical trust,
such that trust in one object (e.g., a hospital) can generate trust in a
second, related object (e.g., a physician on staff at the trusted hospi-
tal).253 This can happen when interpersonal trust in one object is ex-
tended to a second object, but it may also result from a transfer of
systemic trust. For example, a patient who does not have any personal
experience with a hospital might trust that hospital because, based on
its location and its portrayal in the media, she perceives it to be com-
mitted to caring for an underserved population. She then might trust
a physician practicing in that hospital solely because of the physician's
association with the hospital she trusts. In that case, trust in the hospi-
tal is systemic in nature because it arises from information other than
personal experience, and the halo effect operates to extend that sys-
temic trust to include physicians practicing in the hospital. Thus,
while the objects and sources of trust in medicine are subject to con-
ceptual categorization, the halo effect demonstrates that medical trust
operates across categorical boundaries in practice, as trust in one ob-
ject generates trust in another.254
The substantive elements of medical trust and their effect upon
each other also demonstrate that, despite its many shapes and forms,
medical trust must be regarded as a singular phenomenon. Trust in
medicine is comprised of several identifiable elements, including "fi-
delity, competence, honesty, and confidentiality."255 Yet, researchers
have found that change in any one of these dimensions of medical
trust creates a similar change in each of the other dimensions such
that, in practice, medical trust operates as one, "unidemensional
construct. " 2 5 6
In addition to learning more about what medical trust is, re-
newed interest in medical trust has confirmed our sense of how trust
at broader categories such as the medical profession or hospitals in general. See id.
Thus, it is possible for a patient to trust her local hospital (interpersonal trust) while
distrusting hospitals in general (systemic (dis)trust).
253 See id. at 620.
254 Although trust is used to explain this point, the same is true of distrust as well.
255 Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 476.
256 See Hall et al., supra note 251, at 623-24.
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affects patient behavior.257 Studies confirm that trust among patients
positively correlates with seeking needed medical care. In other
words, the more trust a patient places in medicine, the more likely the
patient is to obtain care when it is needed, and the less trusting a
patient, the more likely the patient is to postpone seeking care. Like-
wise, the more trusting a patient, the more likely the patient is to com-
ply with a treatment plan and, thus, the more likely the patient is to
experience a positive clinical outcome. 258 There is also speculation
that medical trust triggers the placebo effect and other mechanisms of
healing that cannot be explained scientifically. 259 Furthermore, medi-
cal trust has economic value as well. Trusting patients are less likely to
question their physicians' medical judgments by seeking second opin-
ions, and they are less likely to enter into disputes with care providers
when a bad outcome occurs. 260 Additionally, trusting patients are also
likely to recommend their hospital or physician to another.261
Thus, medical trust has substantial instrumental value in that it
encourages medically responsible behavior in the face of illness or in-
jury, and it does so in ways that minimize the economic costs of treat-
ment.262 As I have written elsewhere, a trusting patient "is a dream
patient-a satisfied, repeat customer who follows doctors' orders,
does not visit competitors or raise a fuss about treatment received, and
even drums up new business from time to time. '26 3 Additionally,
some say that medical trust has intrinsic value. For example, Professor
Mark A. Hall writes that medical trust is a core value of any treatment
relationship because it enables patients to cope with the vulnerability
created by a health crisis and the assault on a patient's sense of self
that can otherwise occur.264 I interpret claims about the intrinsic
value of medical trust as indications of the extraordinary degree of
257 See id. at 629; see also Mechanic, The Functions and Limitations of Trust in the
Provision of Medical Care, supra note 249.
258 See Hall et al., Trust in the Medical Profession, supra note 249, at 1432-33; Thom
et al., supra note 249, at 514.
259 See Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 479-81.
260 See Hall et al., Trust in the Medical Profession, supra note 249, at 1433.
261 See Kao et al., Patients' Trust, supra note 249, at 684 tbl.4 (the duration of pa-
tient-physician relationships tend to be longer among patients with high physician
trust scores when compared to patients with comparatively lower physician trust
scores).
262 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. ECON. REv. 941, 965 (1963), reprinted in 26J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 851, 875
(2001) (noting that trust reduces transaction costs in medicine); see also Hall, Arrow,
supra note 249, at 1133-34.
263 Gatter, supra note 140, at 401.
264 Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 477-78.
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importance we as a society attach to the medical trust as a coping
mechanism. In other words, we so highly value what medical trust can
do for us during a medical crisis that we perceive medical trust as not
just a means to an end, but as an end unto itself.26 5
In the end, one can picture medical trust as a phenomenon om-
nipresent throughout our health care delivery system, flowing seam-
lessly among various treatment relationships and enabling a given
patient to form a single attitude toward all parts of an institutionally
coordinated team of professionals and resources that comprise the
system on which the patient relies for her medical care, while at the
same time encouraging patient behaviors that effectively and effi-
ciently promote health. With this picture in mind, a viable explana-
tion for why the law has refused to impose informed consent duties on
hospitals begins to take shape.
Courts, relying on an intuitive sense of medical trust and its value,
conclude that rules of law should be consistent with the preservation
of medical trust. This conclusion is particularly likely when courts
rule on informed consent claims against physicians because the in-
formed consent doctrine arises from fiduciary principles.2 66 Courts
reason that patients are vulnerable in the medical decisionmaking
process because they do not have the information they need to make
good decisions and because they lack the ability to find and under-
stand that information. Thus, they depend on their physicians for in-
formation and explanations. Indeed, patients are so dependent on
their physicians that courts conceive of the doctor-patient relationship
as a trust relationship. 267 This, in turn, leads courts to use fiduciary
principles to regulate the doctor-patient relationship, including dis-
closure principles that have resulted in the disclosure duties integral
to informed consent law. In fact, Professor Hall has identified this
-logic in two classic informed consent cases and concluded that in-
formed consent law is a quintessential example of law developed from
a premise of trust.268 In short, informed consent law is a trust-based
doctrine, and so it is logical that courts would work to interpret in-
formed consent law so as to preserve medical trust.
Informed consent law's foundation in a trust designed to address
the informational vulnerability of patients also helps to explain why
courts have applied disclosure duties exclusively to physicians. Early
cases concerning the duty of physicians to disclose treatment informa-
265 See Gatter, supra note 140, at 444-45.
266 See Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 489-91.
267 See id.
268 See id.
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tion to their patients are concerned with a particular kind of vulnera-
bility, namely, the risk that patients cannot make autonomous
treatment decisions because they lack expert knowledge about their
medical conditions and treatment options.269 Thus, the disclosure du-
ties arise from a trust relationship defined by the physician's possess-
ing and the patient's lacking expert medical knowledge. Given this, it
is understandable that courts might fear that informed consent law
would lose its foundation in trust if it did not assure that treatment
information was provided directly from the expert physician to the
vulnerable patient. From this perspective, any interference with the
delivery of treatment information by physician to patient by one who
does not have the medical expertise of a physician risks slowing or
diverting the flow of information and, as a result, undermining the
ability of the expert physician to address the patient's informational
vulnerability. This, in turn, offers a plausible explanation for why
courts that refuse to impose informed consent duties on hospitals
have consistently returned to the premise that only physicians have
the expertise to inform patients and that the process of disclosure
must be protected from nonexperts. 2 70 Similarly, this may explain
why those courts consistently refer to hospital involvement in the in-
formed consent process as "interfering"27 1 and "meddlesome." 272
Courts may also have concluded that informed consent should be
the exclusive turf of physicians based on intuitive notions about the
intrinsic value of medical trust inherent in the doctor-patient relation-
ship. In Cooper v. Curry,273 the New Mexico Supreme Court refused to
impose informed consent duties on a hospital because it would under-
mine the "fiduciary relationship" between doctor and patient.2 74
More subtly, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled similarly, referring to the
informed consent process as lying "at the heart of the doctor-patient
269 See id.
270 See supra Part I.B.
271 See, e.g., Sherwood-Armour v. Danbury Hosp., 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 659, 660
(Super. Ct. 2003); Ackerman v. Lerwick, 676 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Neb. 1997); Cooper v. Curry, 589 P.2d 201, 204
(N.M. Ct. App. 1978); Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of N. Tenn., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 804,
809 (Tenn. 2000).
272 See, e.g., Ward v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 963 P.2d 1031,
1039 (Alaska 1998); Fiorentino v. Wegner, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967); Campbell
v. Pitt County Mem'I Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 914 (Ct. App.), afJ'd, 362 S.E.2d 273
(N.C. 1987); Alexander v. Gonser, 711 P.2d 347, 351 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Mathias
v. St. Catherine's Hosp., Inc., 569 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
273 589 P.2d 201.
274 Id. at 204.
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relationship. '" 275 Claims that the informed consent doctrine is at the
core of a fiduciary doctor-patient relationship, like claims that trust is
the primary value of all treatment relationships, 276 lead to the conclu-
sion that the law must guard against intrusions into the doctor-patient
relationship so as to avoid disrupting the fragile processes through
which medical trust is developed and maintained. Indeed, the fragil-
ity of trust is a central lesson from the modern analysis of medical
trust. Trust is perceived as an unstable, psychological state that is ir-
reparably damaged if it is perceived to have been breached. 277 Ac-
cordingly, references of courts rejecting informed consent claims
against hospitals to the informed consent process as the most "deli-
cate" matter in the "delicate" doctor-patient relationship, 278 may re-
flect the law's perception that, if it were to require hospitals to
participate in the disclosure process, it would be inviting a bull into
the china shop of medical trust. Indeed, this may also explain why
courts have refused to impose not only disclosure duties on hospitals,
but also duties to assure that physicians have obtained a patient's in-
formed consent prior to treatment.279 Some courts have reasoned
that imposing a duty to assure consent will put the law on a slippery
slope toward imposing a duty to disclose. 280 This could reflect the
perception that, given the fragility of trust in medicine, the best policy
is to keep hospitals completely out of the informed consent process so
as not to take any risk of an erosion of trust.28 1
Finally, the trust hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for
why the law's policy against imposing informed consent duties on hos-
pitals has survived despite the clinical reality that hospitals are deeply
involved in the informed consent process. First, given the extraordi-
275 Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 362 (Iowa 1987).
276 See Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 477.
277 See Gatter, supra note 140, at 402-03; Hall et al., supra note 251, at 618;
Mechanic, Changing Medical Organization, supra note 249, at 173 (" [T] rust is particu-
larly fragile because negative events are more visible, they carry greater psychological
weight, they are perceived as more credible, and they inhibit the kinds of experience
needed to overcome distrust.").
278 See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Wegner, 227 N.E.2d 296, 300 (N.Y. 1967) (describing the
doctor-patient relationship as one of "great delicacy" and referring to the informed
consent process as the most "delicate" matter within that relationship).
279 See supra Part I.C.
280 See, e.g., Campbell v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 911 (N.C.
Ct. App.) (Becton,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affid, 362 S.E.2d 273
(N.C. 1987).
281 See Gatter, ,supra 140, at 402-03 (claiming that, if one conceives of medical
trust as fragile and beyond repair if broken, then this leads to a regulatory strategy of
avoiding breaches of trust).
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nary value that trust appears to bring to health care delivery and the
perception that informed consent uniquely embodies the process by
which medical trust is preserved, courts may conclude that preserving
trust outweighs the need to hold hospitals accountable for their in-
volvement in the informed consent process. They might rationalize
that, by holding physicians exclusively accountable, it gives an incen-
tive to physicians-the presumptive facilitators of medical trust-to
police the intrusiveness of hospitals' participation in informed con-
sent. Alternatively, given the presumptive fragility of medical trust,
the law may have elected to ignore incremental increases in hospital
involvement rather than acknowledge and require hospital involve-
ment, which would (so it is feared) disrupt the delicate process by
which medical trust is maintained.
The more challenging question is how the medical trust hypothe-
sis explains the policy's persistence despite the rise of the corporate
negligence doctrine in health care. The doctrine has been inter-
preted to require hospitals to oversee the competence of those who
practice medicine within the hospital and to assure the quality of care
provided in the hospital. 28 2 Thus, the law forces hospitals to oversee
matters of medical expertise even though hospitals lack medical ex-
pertise themselves. If the law requires hospital oversight of medical
expertise generally, then why not in the specific case of expertise re-
lated to the informed consent process? Moreover, it has been estab-
lished that medical trust includes trust in the competence of
providers. 283 Thus, by requiring hospitals to oversee the competence
of providers practicing medicine within their institutions, it is already
requiring hospitals to tread on the delicate turf of medical trust.
Again, if so, then why not in the case of competence in the informed
consent process?
The answer turns on a distinction that can be drawn between the
relationship of trust to medical malpractice law, on the one hand, and
the relationship of trust to informed consent law, on the other hand.
While both medical malpractice law and informed consent law can be
justified under a principle of promoting trust in medicine, the law has
explicitly regarded the informed consent doctrine as having its foun-
dation in trust principles. 2 4 For example, although informed con-
sent law is enforced through negligence and battery constructs, courts
commonly refer to it as a doctrine arising from fiduciary characteris-
282 See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
283 See Hall et al., supra note 251, at 621-22.
284 See Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 489-94 (contrasting the
relationships of trust to informed consent law and medical malpractice law).
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tics of the doctor-patient relationship.285 In comparison, it is difficult
to find any court that refers to medical malpractice claims as having
their foundation in fiduciary principles. Thus, it is plausible to say
that a physician's duty to obtain a patient's informed consent to treat-
ment goes beyond obligations of due care that are owed in the course
of providing that treatment.28 6 Accordingly, it is at least minimally
rational for courts to rule that the corporate negligence doctrine obli-
gates hospitals to implement systems designed to assure that their phy-
sicians practice with due care, but not systems designed to assure that
their physicians act in accordance with fiduciary obligations that go
beyond obligations of due care.
B. Medical Trust as a Basis for Reforming the Law's Policy
If it is true that the law's policy against imposing informed con-
sent duties on hospitals has survived because of an unarticulated goal
to preserve trust in medicine by declaring the informed consent pro-
cess to be the exclusive domain of physicians and protecting it from
interference by hospitals, then that unarticulated goal also provides a
basis for reforming the law's policy to recognize the institutional in-
formed consent duties outlined above. In short, by refusing to impose
any informed consent duties on hospitals, informed consent law has
lost touch with its own fiduciary foundation. Unless the law enforces
informed consent duties against hospitals, it will erode trust in
medicine.
The law's critical mistake is failing to recognize that physicians
are no longer the only kind of health care provider who enters into a
fiduciary relationship with hospital patients. As hospitals have taken
on responsibilities to organize the delivery of health care to their pa-
tients, they enter into fiduciary relationships with each of their pa-
tients as well, which are defined by the hospital's obligation to protect
285 See id. at 489-91 (analyzing language used in Cobbs v. Grant and Canterbury v.
Spence); see also Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 2d 1064, 1069 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (the informed consent doctrine "grew out of a
treating physician's fiduciary duty to disclose" treatment information to patients);
Moore v. Regents, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (referring to the duty of disclosure as
a physician's "fiduciary duty"); Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 800 A.2d 73, 78
(N.J. 2002) ("[The] patient-centered view of informed consent stresses... the fiduci-
ary relationship between a doctor and his or her patients."); Keogan v. Holy Family
Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Wash. 1980) (referring to the physician's duty to obtain
informed consent as a "fiduciary" duty).
286 See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The patient's
reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obli-
gations beyond those associated with arms-length transactions.").
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the well-being of patients under their care. 28 7 In fact, given that hos-
pital-based treatment for a particular patient is often provided by sev-
eral physicians and many nurses and technicians, and that it is
coordinated through various labs and departments, it is best to con-
ceive of the patient's having entered into one relationship with the
hospital and attending physician as cofiduciaries, who together are re-
sponsible for the coordinated care of the patient.288
The role of the hospital as a fiduciary certainly finds support in
the general duty imposed by the corporate negligence doctrine for
hospitals to take reasonable measures to safeguard their patients. As
described above, the corporate negligence doctrine arises out of the
law's recognition that hospitals play a vital role in assuring the quality
of hospital care through its staffing of the hospital and its policies and
procedures for organizing its resources for the purpose of executing a
particular treatment plan. 2 9 This role for hospitals directly implicates
the competence and fidelity components of medical trust.290 By assur-
ing that its facilities are properly maintained and equipped, that they
are adequately staffed with personnel whose qualifications to practice
medicine have been verified, and that measures are in place to coordi-
nate the various aspects of treatment so as to prevent substandard care
at any time during a patient's population, the hospital is improving
the system's competence to provide quality care. In so doing, the hos-
pital is also placing above other considerations the patient's interest in
receiving complex medical care in a safe and effective manner.
Moreover, the hospital's fiduciary role is apparent in its manage-
ment of the informed consent process in particular. By expressly re-
quiring that patients provide informed consent prior to any hospital-
based treatment, by providing consent forms and implementing pro-
cedures for their use, and by assigning hospital employees to confirm
that there is evidence of informed consent prior to treatment, hospi-
tals serve the patients' interests in understanding their treatment op-
tions and having their treatment preferences honored. Furthermore,
hospitals are taking seriously the interest of patients in not only receiv-
ing treatment information, but also in receiving information in a man-
ner that is likely to result in understanding, and in receiving assistance
287 SeeCooper v. Curry, 589 P.2d 201, 207 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (Sutin,J., dissent-
ing) ("A fiduciary relationship exists between hospital-patient and physician-
patient.").
288 See Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Physicians and Hospital
Managers as Cofiduciaries of Patients: Rhetoric or Reality?, 48J. HEALTHCARE MGMT. 172,
176 (2003).
289 See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
290 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
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to sort through that information so as to arrive at decisions that reflect
patients' unique values. This is evident in the fact that hospitals are
piloting automated informed consent applications designed to pro-
vide patients with a thorough presentation of standard information
related to their treatment options at a pace and employing language
that will improve comprehension. Additionally, it is demonstrated by
hospitals assigning employees to help guide patients through the deci-
sionmaking process after all treatment information is in hand.
Indeed, the steadily increasing role of hospitals in the informed
consent process indicates the degree to which patients remained vul-
nerable in the medical decisionmaking process when only physicians
were attempting to meet their decisionmaking needs. Often, patients
who received complex treatment information in a meeting with a busy
physician were left to make treatment choices without being fully
aware of the nature and consequences of their decisions and without
any safeguard against being overwhelmed by the information pro-
vided or by the decision itself. Physicians simply do not have the time
to assure that each patient understands the treatment information
provided or to guide them through the task of sorting treatment infor-
mation and identifying their own preferences for the purposes of
making an autonomous decision. Thus, patients have an unmet need
for help to understand treatment information and make autonomous
choices even after treatment information has been disclosed. Accord-
ingly, the syllogism that gave rise to the fiduciary obligation of physi-
cians to disclose treatment information to patients also gives rise to a
fiduciary obligation of hospitals, as coordinators of care, to further
assist patients in the medical decisionmaking process.291
In this way, the goal of preserving medical trust accounts for the
core reason why courts refuse to impose informed consent duties on
hospitals. If the trust hypothesis is correct, courts are concerned that,
by requiring hospitals to interfere in the informed consent process, it
will fail to enable physicians to address the vulnerability of patients in
the medical decisionmaking process. Given that patients remain vul-
nerable in the absence of additional decisionmaking assistance, how-
ever, and that hospitals are in a better position than physicians to
291 See Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, supra note 249, at 477-78 (stating that pa-
tients are dependent on their health care provider for assistance in understanding
their treatment choices so that patients can decide for themselves what course of
treatment to undertake, and this dependence creates a vulnerability that is character-
istic of trust relationships in which the entrusted party is obligated to assist the en-
trusting party in ways that go beyond due care, and so health care providers should be
obligated to assist patients to understand their treatment choices in ways consistent
with a fiduciary relationship).
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provide that additional assistance, the goal of preserving trust in
medicine is best served by imposing informed consent duties on
hospitals.
The trust hypothesis also accounts for any claimed distinction be-
tween the application of the corporate negligence doctrine to a
breach of negligence standards and its application to a breach of fidu-
ciary standards. As discussed above, a viable argument exists that hos-
pitals are obligated to implement systems to prevent medical
negligence among their physicians, but that this does not include obli-
gations to oversee physicians' compliance with fiduciary obligations
that exceed the requirements of due care. The argument is unpersua-
sive, however, if the law is attempting to preserve trust in medicine. As
argued above, whether preventing harms that would be compensated
under principles of negligence or fiduciary principles, hospitals assist
in the project of preserving trust in medicine when they participate in
the coordination of all aspects of a patient's care, including the pro-
cess of informed consent.
The touchstone of preserving medical trust also places in per-
spective the law's concern for expertise in the informed consent pro-
cess. Undoubtedly, physicians are experts in identifying patients'
medical conditions, the options for treating those conditions, and the
risks and benefits of each of those options. Thus, while hospitals can
improve the competence of the informed consent process by contrib-
uting expertise in the communication of treatment information, ex-
pertise in aiding patients to process treatment information, and
expertise in confirming that the informed consent process is complete
prior to treatment, they cannot and should not replace physicians as
medical experts. Indeed, to do so would undermine the competence
of the informed consent process and thus be inconsistent with the
goal of preserving trust in medicine. Instead, the goal of preserving
trust leads to a coordinated distribution of expertise so as to improve
the overall competence of the informed consent process.
Finally, preserving trust in hospital-based informed consent
processes requires a measure of accountability. 29 2 As described above,
it is unclear whether the increasing role that hospitals play in manag-
ing the informed consent process sufficiently serves the interests of
patients. There is a risk that a hospital will manage its informed con-
sent process in ways that serve its own interests to increase the likeli-
hood that physicians will refer patients to the hospital, to free-up
clinical time for physicians to provide additional fee-generating proce-
292 See Gatter, supra note 249, at 361-63 (explaining how a trustworthy medical
system requires a legally accountable medical system).
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dures, to improve the public image of the hospital, or to increase its
patient satisfaction scores. Yet, there is no guarantee that serving
these interests also adequately protect patients' interests. Thus, the
responsibility of the law is to impose institutional informed consent
duties that will provide hospitals with the incentive to assure that
equipment and staff involved in the informed consent process are well
coordinated so that patients are not injured by defects in the system.
Such duties contribute to the preservation of medical trust by promot-
ing the legal accountability of hospitals with respect to informed con-
sent, which increases the opportunity for "systematic" medical trust to
develop. 293
CONCLUSION
The law's policy against imposing informed consent duties on
hospitals is a mysterious exception to the modern trend in law of hold-
ing hospitals responsible for safeguarding the patients they serve and
the law's more limited view on the importance of medical expertise in
the informed consent process. The oddity of this policy is magnified
by the clinical realities that cut against it. Clinical experience indi-
cates that doctors have limited time to provide treatment information
to patients at all, let alone in ways that are likely to promote under-
standing. Additionally, hospitals have increasingly involved them-
selves in the informed consent process, at first, through the
implementation of policies, procedures, and forms, and then through
the use of employees to record and confirm consent and through the
direct dissemination of treatment information to patients. Today,
hospitals are preparing to manage the informed consent process thor-
oughly through the use of automated informed consent applications
and live counselors.
Throughout all of this change, the law's policy has remained un-
changed. It has insisted that only physicians have the expertise and
professionalism to conduct the informed consent process, and that
hospitals will undermine that process and the doctor-patient relation-
ship by getting involved. It has held this position despite recognizing
that hospitals participate at least to some degree in the informed con-
sent process, and it has not budged even in the face of the corporate
negligence doctrine that imposes a duty on hospitals to safeguard
their patients and oversee the quality of care provided to them.
Hospitals can add value to the medical decisionmaking process
by assuring that patients receive standard treatment information deliv-
293 For a description of systematic trust in medicine, see supra notes 250-55 and
the accompanying text.
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ered in an understandable manner, that they can communicate with
their physicians about particular questions and unique informational
needs, that patients have access to individuals who can help them pro-
cess treatment information and make treatment decisions that reflect
their preferences, and that patients have in fact completed the in-
formed consent process before treatments are provided. Thus, the
law should impose institutional informed consent duties on hospitals
as proposed in this Article so as to redistribute informed consent re-
sponsibilities more reasonably among physicians and hospitals.
Given the persistence of the law's policy against imposing in-
formed consent duties on hospitals, however, it is unclear whether any
reform proposal can succeed. The thesis of this Article has been that
an unarticulated rationale has driven courts to maintain the policy
against institutional informed consent duties despite its apparent in-
consistency with clinical and legal trends. I have argued that a mis-
guided effort to preserve trust in medicine may be at work. If this is
true, then a full understanding of medical trust and its application to
the informed consent process should cause courts to reconsider the
policy and impose institutional informed consent duties that would
not only encourage hospitals to improve the quality of informed con-
sent, but also assure that those improvements serve the interests of
patients.
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